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Relevant results from long lasting 
work on C(I)IP will be tangible  
With the tenth ECN issue the articles move from awareness to case studies, results 
of C(I)IP research and conceptual innovations. C(I)IP is now discussed for years at 
policy and conceptual levels. The policy actors have completed fundamental 
studies and start to take action. 
                                                            
About this Issue 
Andrea Servida highlights the 
background on which an EU policy 
initiative on Critical Communication and 
Information Infrastructure Protection 
(C(I)IP) may grow and gives inside into 
the action points of this initiative. 
Two articles on the Integrated Risk 
Reduction of Information-based 
Infrastructure Systems “IRRIIS” project 
follow: 
• An overview on IRRIIS is given, 
pointing out the SimCIP simulation 
and the four components of the 
middleware improved technology 
MIT. 
• Functional principle of MIT 
middleware improved technology 
and its four main component give 
insights on the tool. 
 
The EUropean Risk Assessment 
Methodology project EURAM integrates 
with the same yardstick risk assessment 
form corporate level up up to European 
level. The elaborated results are presented 
and an outlook for the successor project 
EURACOM is given. 
   
A report on The First Dutch Process 
Control Security Event is given by Eric 
Luiijf pointing out the strong need for 
actions in securing PCS. Three general 
recommendation discussed during the 
Event are disclosed to the reader.  
The Royal Academy of Engineering 
published its report Dilemmas of Privacy 
and Surveillance in March 2007. In spite 
of all securing measures this report 
demonstrates how to consider urgent 
demands of our privacy. 
Today’s risks to the financial sector 
discloses that “Financial Industry Sector” 
lost its e-innocence: New e-risk factors 
have appeared. As a result, the financial 
sector has to deal with e-espionage, 
identity theft and the problems of 
international terrorism. 
Cyber Security Assessment of a Power 
Plant analyses in a true corporate 
environment the risk of attacking the 
power process control environment. The 
results are presented in text and graphs. 
Governance and Risk Management in a 
globally integrated Ecosystem discusses 
critical information infrastructure assur-
ance and its approach of model-driven 
risk management presuming robust 
enterprise architecture (EA). 
Furthermore, news on The International 
CIIP Handbook 2008/2009, events such 
as Critis’08, IMF 08 and ICCR is 
presented. 
First universities start to offer 
professorships on C(I)IP. See the 
advertisement of the University of Lisboa 
Faculty of Sciences FCUL. 
Enjoy reading this issue of the ECN! 
 
PS. Authors willing to contribute to future 
ECN issues are very welcome. Please 
contact me or one of the national 
representatives. Further information 
about the ECN and its publication 
policies can be found in the introduction 
of the first ECN, see www.irriis.eu.
 
 
Bernhard M. Hämmerli 
Professor in Information Security 
Founder of the Executive Master 
Program IT Security, FHZ  
Vice-President ISSS Information 
Security Society Switzerland and 
Chair of Scientific and 
International Affairs 
 
e-mail:  bmhaemmerli@acris.ch  
  bmhaemmerli@hslu.ch  
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Towards an EU Policy Initiative on 
Critical Communication and Informa-
tion Infrastructure Protection1    
Several EU studies on Critical Communication and Information Infrastructure 
Protection have been completed. CIP strengthening actions are planned based on 
the preliminary studies, the G8 principles and OECD activities. 
 
 
Andrea Servida 
Deputy Head of Unit 
European Commission, 
Directorate General Information 
Society and Media 
 
e-mail: 
andrea.servida@ec.europa.eu 
  
Communication and information1 
infrastructures are the nervous system of 
the Information Society. Many services 
and processes in our economy and 
society are increasingly dependent on 
the proper functioning of these 
infrastructures. In addition, the processes 
of liberalisation, deregulation and 
convergence have brought about a 
multiplicity of players, while nowadays 
a large part of these infrastructures are 
owned and operated by the private 
sector. At the same time, by their nature, 
communication and information 
infrastructures often stretch out well 
beyond national borders. Their level of 
security and resilience in any country 
depends heavily on the level of security 
and resilience which have been put in 
place outside its national borders. In this 
respect, national governments face very 
similar issues and challenges while the 
private sector is calling for harmonised 
protection measures. 
Because of this trans-national 
dimension, a more integrated and co-
ordinated approach throughout the 
European Union may usefully 
complement and add value to the 
programmes which are already in place 
within Member States. It will also 
contribute to reinforce the wealth 
creation capabilities of the European 
single market. To address these issues, 
in May 2006, the European Commission 
made proposals to revitalise its strategy  
                                                 
1 Disclaimer: the views presented in this 
paper are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent those of the European 
Commission 
 
for a Secure Information Society2. This 
strategy defines a holistic approach to 
network and information security (NIS) 
in Europe, highlighting the respective 
roles and obligations of each and every 
stakeholder. In 2007, the main elements 
of this strategy were endorsed by the 
European Council in a Resolution3 that 
provided a strong political signal of the 
need to work together towards 
enhancing the level of NIS in Europe. 
One of the main actions announced in 
the strategy is the multi-stakeholder 
dialogue on the security and resilience of 
communication and information 
infrastructures as the Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) 
sector specific approach under the 
European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) 
adopted by the Commission at the end of 
20064. In June 2008, the European 
Council reached a political agreement on 
a directive on the identification and 
designation of the European Critical 
Infrastructures and the assessment of the 
need to improve their protection5  that 
constitutes one of the main elements of 
                                                 
2 COM(2006) 251 of 31.05.2006 
(http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy
/nis/index_en.htm) 
33 Council Resolution 2007/C 68/01 of 
24.03.2007 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:068:
SOM:EN:HTML) 
4 See 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33260.ht
m  
5 See 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/s
t09/st09403.en08.pdf 
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EPCIP. The formal adoption of this 
directive is expected by the end of the 
year. 
The multi-stakeholder dialogue on the 
security and resilience of 
communication and information 
infrastructures will contribute to shape 
up the Commission policy initiative on 
Critical communication and Information 
Infrastructures Protection (CIIP) planned 
for the beginning of 2009. The objective 
of this initiative, which is part of the 
Commission Legislative Work 
Programme for 2008, will be to enhance 
the level of CIIP preparedness and 
response across the European Union. To 
achieve this aim, the initiative will build 
on national and private sector activities 
and will involve relevant public and 
private stakeholders in ensuring that 
adequate and consistent levels of 
preventive, detection, emergency and 
recovery measures are put into operation 
to ensure a high level of security and 
resilience of critical communication and 
information infrastructures as well as to 
guarantee the continuity of services. 
 
The preparatory steps 
 
To prepare the initiative on CIIP, the 
Directorate General Information Society 
and Media of the European Commission 
has launched a number of studies and 
consultations. 
The first study was launched in 2006 to 
assess the on availability and reliability 
of electronic communication 
infrastructures. The study, which is 
called ARECI and was carried out by 
Alcatel–Lucent, has identified ten 
recommendations and addressed to 
private sector, Member States and the 
European institutions. The 
recommendations cover a number of 
critical areas, such as emergency 
exercises, critical infrastructure 
information sharing, inter-infrastructure 
dependency, formal mutual aid 
agreements, priority communications on 
public networks and interoperability 
testing. The study also highlights the 
need for a much stronger and effective 
public private partnership at National 
and European level. The publication of 
the ARECI final report was followed by 
a call for comments that engaged a 
number of private and public 
stakeholders in providing comments on 
the findings and recommendations of 
ARECI6.  
In 2007, Directorate General 
Information Society and Media of the 
European Commission requested the 
European network and information 
security agency (ENISA) to investigate 
the feasibility of a European Information 
Sharing and Alert Systems (EISAS) that 
would build on existing national 
systems, be of benefit for the EU 
citizens, help share information and pool 
together expertises. The EISAS final 
report7 highlights both the benefit of 
fostering the dialogue among national 
information sharing systems as well as 
the need to take a step-wise approach to 
realise such a system. To this end, 
earlier this year the European Commis-
sion launched a call for proposals for a 
prototype of a European multilingual 
information-sharing and alert system 
under the EPCIP financing scheme. 
In additions to studies, the Directorate 
General Information Society and Media 
launched a round of consultation via 
workshops with Member States and 
private stakeholders on country code 
Top Level Domain (ccTLD) 
Contingency Plans; raising security 
awareness and strengthening the trust of 
end-users; on lessons learnt from large 
scale attacks on the Internet; the 
definition of ICT sectoral criteria; the 
role of private sectors in protecting 
                                                 
6 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/
nis/strategy/activities/ciip/areci_study/index_e
n.htm 
7 See 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/studies/EI
SAS_finalreport.pdf  
critical communication and information 
infrastructures. Detailed information on 
findings and recommendations of these 
discussions are found on the Directorate 
General Information Society and Media 
web page on CIIP8. More consultations 
are planned in the remaining part of the 
year. 
The planned areas for action 
 
The preparatory activities have helped 
the European Commission to identify 
both the key issues to be addressed in 
the planned policy initiative on CIIP as 
well as the potential synergies to be 
developed between preventive measures 
and reactive measures, including those 
pertaining to the cooperation of law 
enforcement and judicial services in 
fighting cyber-crime and cyber 
terrorism. The main areas for action 
currently being considered are: 
• The definition of the sectoral criteria 
to identify the European critical 
infrastructures for the ICT sector, as 
foreseen by the directive on the 
identification and designation of 
European Critical Infrastructure.  
• The improvement of the incident 
response capability at national and 
Europe level. The intention is to 
invite Member States to 
establish/reinforce national incident 
response capability, possibly built on 
National/Governmental 
CERTs/CSIRTs, as a key resource 
for preparedness, information 
sharing, coordination and incident 
response. A central task of such a 
national incident response capability 
would be to organise National 
exercises for contingency planning 
and disaster recovery whose 
importance will be highlighted. 
Member States will also be 
encouraged to reinforce the pan 
European cooperation between 
National/Governmental 
CERTs/CSIRTs with a view to 
                                                 
8 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/
nis/strategy/activities/ciip/index_en.htm 
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facilitate the exchange of 
information, technical measures and 
good practices; enhance the 
preparedness at the European level 
by organising regional exercises 
and/or pan European on simulated 
large-scale network security 
incidents/attacks; facilitate the 
contact and cooperation between 
National capabilities in case of 
incidents or crises. Lastly, 
National/Governmental 
CERTs/CSIRTs may constitute the 
key component of a multi-lingual 
European Information Sharing and 
Alert System (EISAS). 
• The development of a trusted public-
private partnership at the European 
level on security and resilience to 
support information sharing and 
dissemination of good practices.  
• Bridging gaps on national CIIP 
policies across Europe and 
reinforcing the cooperation and the 
information exchange between 
Member States. To date, only a 
limited number of Member States 
has developed policy approach in 
this area. Building on the existing 
activities and work, a mechanism 
will be proposed to support 
information sharing and transfer of 
good policy practices between 
Member States.  
• The international dimension of CIIP 
to reinforce co-operation on global 
issues, in particular the security and 
the robustness of the Internet.  
Several other issues will require 
attention among which are the need to 
plan for recovery and continuity 
strategies, the definition of cross-sectors 
proactive information assurance 
methods, the promotion of risk 
management culture and tools and the 
consideration of inter-dependencies. 
In shaping up this initiative, 
internationally recognised principles like 
the G8 principles on CIIP and the UN 
General Assembly Resolution on the 
'Creation of a global culture of cyber 
security and the protection of critical 
information infrastructures', as well as 
OECD related activities would be taken 
in due account. 
This initiative will constitute a 
significant step forward in the 
implementation of the Commission's 
strategy for a Secure Information 
Society.  
 9
 
Project IRRIIS – preliminary results 
to increase dependability of CIs 
After two years of project work a set of models and first prototypes of tools are 
available to support analysis of CI interdependencies and to manage critical events 
that affect the resilience of networked large complex critical infrastructures. 
 
Rüdiger Klein 
Dr. Klein is senior researcher at the Fraun-
hofer Institute for Intelligent Analysis and 
Information Systems; Project Coordinator 
of the EU Integrated Project IRRIIS 
Phone +49-2241-14-2608 
E-mail: ruediger.klein@iais.fraunhofer.de 
Website: www.sit.fraunhofer.de  
 
 
Mechthild Stöwer 
Senior consultant and researcher at the 
Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information 
Technology (SIT) 
Department Secure Processes and 
Infrastructures (SPI) 
Phone +49-2241-14-3123 
E-mail: m.stoewer@sit.fraunhofer.de 
Website: www.sit.fraunhofer.de   
 
 
 
Final project year for IRRIIS has 
begun 
The EU-integrated Project “Integrated 
Risk Reduction of Information-based 
Infrastructure Systems – IRRIIS” has 
started in February 2006 with the target 
to enhance substantially the 
dependability of Large Complex Critical 
Infrastructures (LCCIs) by developing 
appropriate models for interdependency 
analyses, provide techniques to simulate 
dependent infrastructures and to deliver 
Middleware Improved Technology 
(MIT) components to manage 
interdependent critical infrastructures.  
In focus of the project activities are 
(inter)dependencies between two 
different CIs of the same or in different 
sectors. The electrical power and 
telecommunication infrastructure are of 
special interest in this case and have 
been selected to be the first test cases for 
IRRIIS analyses and developments.  
The project is supported by the 
European Union’s Sixth Framework 
Programme and brings together partners 
from research and industry from eight 
EU countries and Switzerland. Among 
them are important operators of 
telecommunication and electrical power 
infrastructures and technology providers. 
Inclusion of stakeholders view 
IRRIIS final target is to achieve a broad 
utilisation of the project results by the 
stakeholders from research and industry. 
Technology components should be 
included in the portfolio of operators and  
 
technology providers as well as the 
developed methods and models which in 
particular address the research 
community.  
This requires constant feedback on 
project activities and results:  
• The project is accompanied by an 
advisory board consisting of 
representatives of research 
organisations and relevant 
companies operating in the field of 
LCCIs. This board evaluates results 
and gives advice for promising 
development paths.  
• To include broad feedback three 
international workshops have been 
organized so far which were 
attended by more than 200 
participants.  
• The feedback process is supported 
by bilateral discussions with 
operators of CIs and technology 
providers to present and evaluate 
IRRIIS developments. 
This close cooperation will guaranty that 
the results of the projects fit to the 
specific needs of stakeholders who will 
use them to increase stability and 
resilience of CIs and push the progress 
in scientific research. 
Fundamental analysis and 
future network requirements as 
basis of IRRIIS developments 
The ambitious targets of the project also 
include the objective that the IRRIIS 
developments will support requirements 
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of future networks that already become 
visible and that may aggravate the 
effects of interdependencies between 
CIs. For 
the 
electrical 
power 
infrastruct
ure these 
are in 
particular: 
• Smart grids require more flexibility 
than existing network structures: 
• Increased competition in energy 
market is leading to high cost 
pressure: 
• Infrastructures are aging and 
required investments often are 
delayed: 
• A lack of experts to operate CIs is 
emerging:  
• A high number of small scale units 
based on renewable energy sources 
and combined heat and power plants 
(CHP) mainly in distribution 
networks and large offshore wind 
parks with increasing distance from 
load centres have to be integrated 
and managed. 
These challenges increase the demand 
for intelligent management systems 
which will be considered in the IRRIIS 
modelling activities and included in the 
development of the technology 
components.  
IRRIIS methodology: 
Understanding 
(inter)dependencies 
Though the topic of CI dependencies is 
of high interest, the variety of methods 
for analysis is very limited and the 
current approaches do not provide 
enough support for analysis of real life-
situations. As main deficits the 
following two factors are identified [1]:  
• A sharp definition of dependencies 
is still missing, and 
• Appropriate support for modelling 
essential real-life influencing factors 
as quality factors, various states of 
operations and 
environmental factors is 
missing. 
To overcome these deficits a 
methodology is provided to 
assess the risk factors to CIs at 
the various levels of 
abstraction (management, service, cyber, 
and physical) including an assessment 
whether IRRIIS Middleware Improved 
Technology (MIT) may help to mitigate 
threats and incidents. The approach is 
supported by a failure database 
maintained by an IRRIIS project partner. 
Modelling complex network 
infrastructures 
Complex networks are inherently 
difficult to understand because of their 
structural complexity, network evolution 
and component diversity. For research 
on complex infrastructure networks and 
as a basis for their reliable management 
a set of appropriate models is required. 
Generic and specific models can be 
distinguished. For interdependency 
analyses different 
models for network 
behaviour including 
topology analysis and 
information models 
are of special 
relevance:  
• The IRRIIS 
Information 
Model was 
developed as an expressive common 
framework for modelling and 
analysis of systems of dependent 
critical infrastructures. It provides a 
“lingua franca” in the tradition of 
semantic models for structures, 
behaviours, events and actions 
which are suitable for models of 
quite different types. They are 
needed for the various kinds of 
networks and their 
interdependencies to be modelled 
within IRRIIS. It features a 
network-of-networks approach 
where the different networks and 
their interdependencies can be 
modelled within a unique 
framework. The IRRIIS Information 
Model extends the Implementation-
Service-Effect (ISE) Metamodel 
approach by including additional 
layers and modes. Target groups are 
scientific researches but also 
infrastructure providers. [2] 
• Preliminary Interdependency 
Analysis - PIA and Network 
Analysis: 
Understanding the behaviour and 
risk of Critical Infrastructure (CI) 
requires an understanding of the 
dependencies, and consequently 
interdependencies, within and 
between critical infrastructures. 
Knowing the existence and possible 
mitigating policies against the 
effects of interdependencies can be 
used to increase the dependability 
and resilience of critical 
infrastructure. The Preliminary 
Interdependency Analysis (PIA) and 
the Network 
Analysis are 
methodolog
ies for 
performing 
interdepend
ency 
analysis in 
critical 
infrastructur
es. These 
models can also be used to support 
the design and implementation of 
Middleware Improvement 
Technology (MIT). [3] 
One task for the last project phase will 
be the consolidation of these different 
project models to achieve a coherent 
view on the challenges of networked 
CIs. 
Basic research is 
necessary to understand 
CI interdependencies, 
dynamics and cascading 
effects 
IRRIIS is a highly 
interdisciplinary project 
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The IRRIIS SimCIP simulation 
environment 
SimCIP is the main IRRIIS simulation 
tool. It is used to implement network of 
network models based on the IRRIIS 
Information Model. It is implemented on 
the advanced agent based simulation 
environment LampSys. It allows: 
• to model and to simulate systems of 
Critical Infrastructures, 
• to analyse dependencies within 
complex infrastructure systems and 
between them,  
• to communicate with the MIT tools 
used in IRRIIS for risk estimation, 
crisis prevention, and 
• communication between CI. 
For this purpose, SimCIP has: 
• a model editor allowing users to 
build the simulation models, 
• a sophisticated simulation kernel 
allowing to process simulation 
models, 
• an attractive Graphical User 
Interface allowing users to control 
simulations and to visualize 
simulation results, 
• interfaces to external simulators (an 
interface to Siemens SINCAL 
simulator is available), 
• an interface to import structured 
data for simulation model building, 
and 
• a Web service interface to the MIT 
tools. 
The latter allows using SimCIP as a test 
bed for the IRRIIS Middleware 
Improved Technology (MIT) 
components. 
IRRIIS Middleware Improved 
Technology - MIT 
To support and facilitate the 
communication between different 
infrastructures, IRRIIS has developed 
appropriate middleware communication 
components. All communication 
between different LCCIs should be 
handled by this middleware layer in a 
standard way. 
MIT is made up of: 
1. the MIT communication component 
which is created as a common 
“message layer” to dispatch 
information CIs can/want to share, 
and 
2. MIT add-on components enhancing 
the capabilities of already existing 
tools to improve resilience and to 
mitigate cascading effects. These 
are: 
• Tool for Extracting Functional 
Status (TEFS) to identify 
current functional statuses (in 
service/out of service and/or 
quality of service if relevant) 
and expected ones in the near 
future. For this, TEFS will 
carry out fusion of already 
available and real-time data 
issued from various tools used 
by the LCCI operator to 
monitor the infrastructure. 
• Risk Estimator (RE) to evaluate 
the risk level of 
degradation/outage of services 
that are critical for the mission 
of interconnected external 
infrastructures. For the 
realisation of such function RE 
“correlates” the information 
about the status of the 
processes acquired from the 
local TEFS MIT components 
together with the analogue 
information acquired from the 
MIT systems of the external 
infrastructures. 
Other ‘optional’ add-on components of 
MIT are: 
• Crisis Prevention and Planning 
System (CRIPS) to provide 
knowledge based decision  
support [4] 
• Incident Knowledge Analyser 
(IKA) aims at making the most of 
LCCI experience about past failures 
or critical conditions by properly 
storing and checking at run-time 
whether the current situation has 
any similarity with one which led to 
a disruption of operations in the past 
in order to make useful forecast and 
take proper countermeasures.  
Other add-on components may be 
defined and integrated in the tool set. 
Together with SimCIP and other 
additional system components MIT 
builds the IRRIIS architecture. 
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Scenarios and experimentation 
All IRRIIS developments have to be 
evaluated by realistic scenarios and 
experimentations. For this purpose 
scenarios including four types of CIs 
have been specified and updated for 
IRRIIS experimentation. Different types 
of fault and attack scenarios which 
impact at least a couple of 
infrastructures will be applied.  
To show the adoption of future 
challenges an appropriate scenario will 
be built which consists of realistic future 
networks in the power and/or 
telecommunication domain. 
Use cases for IRRIIS 
components 
The real benefits of the IRRIIS 
developments will become visible by 
specifying appropriate use case. There 
are mainly four use cases to show the 
impact of the components: 
• Using SimCIP to analyse 
(inter)dependencies of CIs and 
identify threats caused by 
disturbance of services from 
connected CIs and specify related 
vulnerabilities. Results of these 
analyses can be used to improve 
risk assessment including specific 
risks induced by 
(inter)dependencies. 
• SimCIP and MIT will contribute to 
a cost effective optimisation of CIs‘ 
network infrastructure design by 
supporting the assessment of 
different architectural concepts 
regarding resilience of CIs. This 
contributes to a mitigation of risks 
caused by disturbances of services 
from connected CIs by 
implementing well targeted 
investments regarding redundancies 
and diversities of network 
components leading to optimised 
network infrastructures.  
• IRRIIS components support the 
handling of critical events having 
earlier and better information and 
appropriate decision support 
available. This means more time to 
decide and to make better decisions 
on a solid basis. 
• By rising awareness to 
(inter)dependency effects IRRIIS 
can support the training of operators 
improving their skills of handling of 
critical events caused by disruption 
of services from other CIs. As 
IRRIIS components can be 
integrated in existing training 
environments the new components 
easily can be adopted. 
Demonstration and training 
Events 
The system environment and the impacts 
will be demonstrated to interested LCCI-
stakeholders in three demonstration 
events in Oct/Nov. 2008 in Germany, 
and in spring 2009 in Italy and Spain.  
One additional training event will take 
place in spring 2009 in Germany to 
make stakeholders familiar with all 
IRRIIS components. 
Summary 
After two years of project work the 
IRRIIS team has elaborated a set of 
methods and models to achieve an in-
depth understanding of 
(inter)dependencies CIs. This knowledge 
is used to provide first prototypes of the 
simulation environment SimCIP and the 
IRRIIS MIT communication platform 
and add-on components. The systems 
will be evaluated by realistic scenarios 
and experiments. Within three 
demonstration events the benefits of the 
solutions will be shown applying 
appropriate use cases.  
More information about the project 
approach and results is provided by the 
IRRIIS web site: www.irriis.org, 
www.irriis.eu  
References 
[1] A. Nieuwenhuijs, E. Luiijf, M. 
Klaver, Modeling Critical Infrastructure 
Dependencies, Paper presented at: 
Second Annual IFIP WG 11.10 
International Conference on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, Arlington, 
Virginia 22201, March 16-19, 2008 
[2] Uwe Beyer, Felix Flentge,  
Towards a Holistic Metamodel for 
Systems of Critical Infrastructures  
preliminary version in European CIIP 
Newsletter, Volume 2, Number 3 
[3] See IRRIIS Deliverable 2.2.4: Report 
on service-oriented interdependency 
analysis, available on IRRIIS web site 
[4] Dellwing, H., Schmitz, W. CRIPS – 
Knowledge based Emergency 
Management tool in European CIIP 
Newsletter, Volume 3, Number 2 
 13
 
MIT: A software tool to facilitate 
CIP 
Data exchange between interdependent infrastructures is thought to increase the 
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Technology is being developed by AIS Ltd under the FP6 project, IRRIIS, to 
facilitate this data exchange. 
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MIT (Middleware Improved 
Technology) is a software tool which 
aims to facilitate data exchange and 
therefore mitigate cascading effects 
between LCCIs (Large Complex Critical 
Infrastructures). This software is being 
developed by AIS Ltd as has been 
specified in the FP6 project, IRRIIS 
(Integrated Risk Reduction for 
Information Based Infrastructure 
Systems). 
Company Background: AIS Ltd.  
Advanced Industrial Systems (AIS) 
Limited is a 
customer 
solutions-oriented 
engineering 
company with 
specific expertise 
in developing and 
implementing nationwide SCADA 
systems. AIS is the technology provider 
in IRRIIS by developing the software 
tools specified in the project to help 
mitigate the cascading effects in LCCIs, 
i.e. MIT. 
Middleware Improved 
Technology 
The aim of this tool is to mitigate the 
cascading effects in LCCIs. This is done 
by increasing and facilitating data 
exchange whilst also providing a means 
of measuring probabilistic risk values for 
service failure between interconnecting 
LCCIs. 
The architecture used to develop MIT 
can be seen in Figure 1. MIT has been 
developed consisting of the 
communication components and various  
add-on components. The 
communicationcomponents are the basis 
for the MIT, onto which the add-on 
components can plug in. Add-on 
components developed by AIS include 
the Risk Estimator, the Incident 
Knowledge Analyser and the Tools to 
Extract the LCCI Functional Status 
(TEFS). IABG has developed the Crisis 
Prevention and Planning System 
(CRIPS) add-on component. MIT allows 
for other add-on components to be added 
to the software in the future. Once an 
LCCI decides to install and use MIT, the 
user can select which of 
the add-on components 
to install and use. The 
essential software 
would include the 
communication 
components, the risk estimator and 
TEFS. Each of these components would 
need to be customised by an expert to 
suit the LCCI’s individual needs. The 
user can then select which of the other 
add-on components to install and use. 
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Figure 1 - MIT Architecture 
The aim of this tool is to 
mitigate cascading 
effects in LCCIs by 
facilitating data exchange 
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The MIT 
Communicator 
The communication 
components are made 
up of four main parts: 
• A Sender module, 
called the Publisher 
• A Receiver module, 
called the Subscriber 
• A Graphical 
Interface to enable 
operators to view and 
send messages 
• A web interface, 
called the LCCI 
Portal, which allows 
Operators to register 
for information. 
A web-based 
administration tool is 
available for administering local users, 
diagnose and view the current 
configuration and for validating Operator 
subscriptions. As part of the 
communication process, an encryption 
library is used to encrypt and sign all 
outgoing messages, verify the signatures 
and decrypts incoming messages. 
The layout of a typical operator interface 
would be as shown in Figure 2. 
Operators connect to system by means of 
the operator web service (Operator WS). 
This web service provides a link between 
the operators and the server resources. A 
corporate router will provide the 
necessary security to keep the 
infrastructure and the operators safe. 
The publisher and subscriber modules 
are implemented as a web service client 
and a web service respectively. The 
publisher has an outbound connection to 
the web services on other Operators, and 
it calls a method on the web service that 
allows it to pass an encrypted XML 
message. The subscriber has an incoming 
interface, and provides methods that 
facilitate communication and key sharing 
functionality. 
The MIT Tools to Extract LCCI 
Functional Status (TEFS) 
TEFS is an essential part of the MIT 
components. It is basically the tool that 
will interface the MIT to the LCCI’s 
infrastructure. In the case of a power 
LCCI, the TEFS component will be the 
interface to the SCADA system and MIT 
will read all necessary data through this 
component. 
The MIT Risk Estimator 
The Risk Estimator can be seen as a risk 
evaluation engine with notification 
capabilities based on an expert system 
and a Fuzzy Control Language (FCL) 
approach. It is based on an abstract 
model of the LCCIs as these are 
modelled in terms of services and 
processes.  
Services are defined as the delivery of 
the final product consumed by the 
infrastructure’s customers. Hence in the 
case of the power industry the service 
would be the availability of power 
supply to the customers. 
Processes on the other hand are defined 
as the carriers of the services. Hence, in 
the case of the power industry the 
process would be the power line 
availability. 
The fundamental building blocks of the 
system will therefore be represented by 
the set of entities that define the LCCI in 
terms of the services and processes 
described above. Each of these services 
and processes has associated to it a set of 
parameters and attributes which will be 
manipulated by the risk estimator’s rules. 
An expert can program into the software 
the FCL which applies to the risk 
calculation for each individual service 
and process. 
One important feature of the Risk 
Estimator is its focus on the risk values 
of services supplied by one infrastructure 
affecting another infrastructure. Hence 
risk values calculated by risk estimator 
not only depend on other internal 
components but also on components and 
factors which are external to the home 
LCCI.  
Figure 2 - Schematic Representation of the Communicator in a typical IT Infrastructure setup 
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Figure 3 - The Map of Risks 
 
Risk Values are depicted on the Map of 
Risks Graph shown in Figure 3. In this 
graph the outer circle shows a zero risk 
value, the centre is the 1.0 probability of 
failure. The green area shows a low risk 
value of between 0 and 0.4, the yellow 
region shows a medium risk value of 
between 0.4 and 0.8, whilst the red area 
shows a high risk value of between 0.8 
and 1.0. Individual Services and 
Processes can be added to this graph in 
order to view the current risk value. The 
arrow direction signifies whether the risk 
value is increasing or decreasing over 
time. 
The MIT Incident Knowledge 
Analyser (IKA) 
The IKA is an optional add-on tool to the 
MIT components which displays past 
historic incident data in the form of a 
mind-map as shown in the screenshot of 
Figure 4. The mind map represents a 
series of past experiences, together with 
related incidents. Experts can add their 
comments, and also any procedures or 
additional information that may be useful 
if another similar situation occurs again. 
Using the mind-map tool, the operator 
can set particular events to indicate that 
they have occurred. The mind-map tool 
allows operators to share the same 
information, and hence, other operators 
can benefit from getting the latest 
verified information from colleagues, so 
that they can react quickly to an evolving 
crisis. 
Besides analysing the consequences of 
an event, an operator can also see what 
other events caused the event being 
examined. For example, a fire might 
have caused an event to occur in the past. 
The operator can verify if a fire occurred 
in the vicinity of a process/service, and 
take appropriate action based on the 
LCCI’s procedures and/or on the actions 
taken when the previous incident 
occurred. 
Crisis Prevention and Planning 
System (CRIPS) 
This tool is being developed by IABG 
and is one of the MIT add-on 
components. CRIPS is a tool which aims 
to support and aid the operator in the 
decision-making process in order to 
reduce the negative impact of cascading 
effects and possibly stop major 
cascading effects which could lead to a 
blackout. This is done by suggesting 
actions to take in case a fault occurs. 
Further information on the IRRIIS 
project can be found on the website: 
http://www.irriis.org / 
 
Figure 4 - Screenshot from the MIT Incident Knowledge Analyser 
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EURAM - EUropean Risk Assessment 
Methodology project 
EURAM developed a uniform risk assessment method for Critical Infrastructures 
that scales across company, sector, cross-sector and European-wide levels.  
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Dealing effectively with threats to and 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures 
(CI) up to the European level requires 
methods for CI risk assessment and CI 
risk management. Risk management 
processes already exist or are under 
development for different critical and 
non-critical sectors in the EU Member 
States. These processes, however, deal 
with different sets of threats and 
different 
approaches. 
The 
European 
Commission 
European 
Programme 
on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(EPCIP) requires a wider co-ordination 
of these risk management processes with 
common basic elements and a 
transversal approach within critical 
sectors, across critical sectors and/or 
cross-border while taking into account 
the (inter)dependencies of CI. To be able 
to accomplish this, there is a need for a 
common understanding and information 
sharing about threats, vulnerabilities and 
risk by all CI stakeholders, e.g., 
operators, emergency management 
centres, policy makers, and independent 
regulators, both with the CI sectors, 
cross-sector and at EU-levels. 
The EPCIP sponsored project EURAM - 
EUropean Risk Assessment Methodolo-
gy project targeted these issues. 
EURAM had the following objectives: 
 identify basic elements for a EU 
methodology for general risk 
assessment,
 
 identify elements for a common 
methodology for analysis of 
(inter)dependencies, 
 support information sharing by 
defining procedures for creating 
qualified and trusted expert 
networks. 
EURAM ran from December 2006 until 
November 2007. The work was 
performed by a TNO Defence, Security 
and Safety-led consortium 
consisting of THALES 
Security (United Kingdom), 
Ericsson (Sweden), ERTICO 
(Belgium), and The 
Netherlands Organisation for 
Applied Scientific Research 
TNO (Netherlands).  
Business to European-wide  
EURAM delivered elements for an 
overarching risk analysis method. This 
method allows a holistic approach at 
different levels of abstraction from the 
business level, via sector and cross-
sector levels up to the European-wide 
multi-national level. In comparison with 
other risk methods, EURAM uses an 
approach that takes the CI dependencies 
into account and accommodates the 
outcomes of earlier risk analyses at 
lower levels of abstraction.  
The TNO-led consortium also studied 
how the various public and private 
stakeholders, who are involved in 
providing resilient critical sector 
services, can share sensitive information 
on risk in a trusted way (‘information 
sharing’).  
 
Re-uses the outcome of 
existing risk assessment; 
only align along an agreed 
’yardstick’ and assess the 
CI dependencies 
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Based on broad expertise in CI 
The EURAM developments are largely 
based upon the broad expertise of the 
consortium partners with critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP). The 
outcome of the study reflects the 
background knowledge by the partners 
stemming from dialogues with the CI 
operators in sectors like energy, tele-
communication, drinking water, 
transport, and water management as well 
as with government agencies in various 
European nations. 
Scalable, lean and mean 
The EURAM holistic risk approach 
addresses the risk from a point of view 
where all expertise at a certain level of 
abstraction is involved. At the business 
level one can think of people responsible 
for and representing process control, 
information systems, human resources 
(e.g. awareness processes) and 
management.  
By using a uniform approach with a 
single list of potential threats, multiple 
teams can work 
in parallel in 
various parts of 
the 
organisation on 
identifying and 
scoring risk 
factors. The 
use of uniform 
yardsticks (e.g. 
a five point 
scale) allows 
communication 
across the 
various teams.  
The risk 
assessment 
method 
developed by 
Thales for a single organisation has been 
extended by TNO with a comprehensive 
set of example ‘yardsticks’ that match 
the EPCIP definition for CI. These 
yardsticks allow risk scoring on the axis 
for seriousness of the effects for the 
citizens, economic damages, environ-
mental damages, political effects, 
psychological effects and health effects.  
This allows a transparent and seaming-
less use of the scales across all levels of 
abstraction. When moving up from the 
business level to the sector level, the 
cross-sector level and the EU multi-
national level, the only additional step to 
be made is a careful analysis of the 
dependencies of other CI. 
Additionally, a set of steps has been 
developed by TNO to identify the full 
set of CI dependencies at a certain level 
of abstraction. These include the second-
level of dependencies which become 
critical when a primary dependency 
fails, e.g. after a power failure, the 
dependency of diesel fuel to run the 
power backup generators becomes 
critical. 
Minimise sensitive exchanges 
When moving up to the next level of 
abstraction, only the identified risk 
which could not be handled in total at 
the lower level, needs to be conveyed at 
the next level. For instance, a business 
can take care of the risk of power 
failures and flooding up to a certain 
extend. The next level needs to take care 
of the risk which exceeds the business 
level, e.g. prolonged power outages or 
major area flooding. At that level, the 
effects of catastrophic events will be 
much larger than at the individual 
business level paired with a much lower 
probability. On the earlier five-point 
scale at the business level, one or more 
risk categories will become of no 
importance while at the top-end new risk 
scoring categories will appear.  In the 
same way, when moving up to a next 
(e.g. multi-national) level, some scoring 
categories will disappear and new ones 
will appear.  
This approach allows the communi-
cation about risk and the handover of 
risk to the proper higher level of 
abstraction without additional efforts. As 
only the risk factors that are not totally 
controlled are communicated, the 
sharing of business or sector specific 
sensitivities is limited to the absolute 
minimum.  
EURAM also encompasses the re-use of 
the results of an existing risk assessment 
in an organisation or by a CI sector. 
Such risk assessments are probably 
based upon another risk method. 
The only step required is to map the 
remaining risk along the EURAM 
‘yardsticks’ and to communicate the 
CI dependencies which form a risk 
to the organisation to the next level.  
Conclusions and outlook 
EURAM has identified a set of 
elements for an umbrella-like risk 
assessment approach covering risk 
assessments from the business up to 
the EU-level which include the risk 
of CI dependencies.  
The EURAM elements and method 
for risk assessment will be put on 
trial in the energy sector as part of 
the EURACOM project, which is also 
sponsored by EPCIP. EURACOM will 
start in the second half of 2008. 
Interested stakeholders who are 
interested in the trial and the method are 
invited to contact the authors. 
Communicate and share the remaining risk and 
the CI dependencies with the next level 
 
Risk 
assessment 
single 
organisation
Dependency
analysis 
Information
sharing
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First Dutch Process Control Security 
Event 
Many organisations do not manage the information security of their process 
control systems (PCS). As risk is increasing, there is an urgent need for public-
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On May 21st , 2008, the Dutch National 
Infrastructure against Cyber Crime 
(NICC) organised their first Process 
Control Security Event. Over 100 
representatives of key industry sectors 
participated in the event. 
Mrs. Annemarie Zielstra, the NICC 
programme manager, opened the event. 
“Earlier studies in 
the Netherlands and 
abroad show that 
many organisations 
do not manage the 
information 
security aspects of 
their process control systems (PCS). As 
risk is increasing, there is an urgent need 
for public-private collaboration by 
government, process control system users, 
and manufacturers against potential cyber 
crime in the PCS domain. Since these 
systems monitor and control processes 
that are critical to society, there may be a 
major safety and economical impact when 
they fail.”  
Such processes comprise for instance the 
supply of power, gas, and drinking water; 
managing surface water; traffic control, 
refineries and other chemical industrial 
processing, automated food processing 
systems, automated milkers, and security 
systems.  
She continued: “The NICC started 
discussing and working on the process 
control security theme with various 
critical infrastructure sectors. After 
analysis of information security weak-
nesses in the PCS of the Dutch drinking 
water sector, a publication with 39 good 
practices for PCS security in the drinking 
water sector was developed [1].  
 
Currently, studies are in progress on the 
information security posture of PCS in the  
Rotterdam harbour and the energy 
Sector.”  
Join the effort 
Foppe Vogd, Program Director Dutch 
CIO Platform, chaired the 
event.  
He emphasised: “This 
event is not a free ride. At 
the end of the day, the 
participants have a moral 
obligation to make the next step: 
enhanced security of their own PCS. This 
is not easy as it requires a joint effort by 
people at the technical level as well as 
management layers. One important 
question today is how to get to the point 
that CEOs and/or CIOs will pay attention 
to the PCS security risk. Or: how do we 
move the known risk to information 
security experts towards the board room?”  
 
 
 
Opening byAnnemarie Zielstra 
“Not a free ride!  Take 
the next step: secure 
your Process Control 
Systems” 
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Life Hacking 
To increase awareness of the audience, 
the German white hacker Christian 
Gresser performed a life hack.  
 
Christian Gresser in action … 
He explained why most PCS hacks that 
have been published in the media seem to 
have happened quite some years ago: 
“People do not want to get the word out 
that the processes of critical utilities are 
vulnerable. However, the reality is that 
PCS are often 10 to 15 years’ old setups 
connected to office automation environ-
ments and also to the Internet. Intrusion is 
easy and free Internet tools may be of 
help.”  
And it is not only about hacking tools! He 
told the audience about some cases where 
physical access to PCS and information 
and communication technologies (ICT) of 
organisations become easy: “The anti-
smoking laws help me and cyber 
criminals as well”. 
Integrated environments 
The next speaker, Kees Jans, the CIO of 
the Schiphol Group, outlined the 
innovative use of ICT at the Schiphol 
airport and JFK’s Terminal 4. Governance 
requires well-founded decisions, risk 
management and security auditing. The 
overall view is left to the CIO. 
 
The view of a CIO (Kees Jans, Schiphol) 
 “PCS are a new risk factor to take into 
account. It is not a separated world 
anymore; increasingly PCS and the 
administrative and business process ICT 
are integrated.” His worries are that new 
systems and applications are put in place 
without proper security considerations by 
one of the many parties at the airport. The 
information 
security awareness 
is low! 
He was challenged by the chairman: “who 
will be on prime time news telling about 
the hack or virus taking down your 
baggage handling system, you or the 
CEO?” His answer showed that the hot 
potato may be given to a system manager 
(provided that the press accepts that). 
 
Need for moving faster 
Because of other obligations, the 
discussion between Frank Heemskerk, 
State Secretary Economic Affairs and 
André Haket, CIO of Stork, was shown 
on videotape. The outline of their 
discussion was about the increased tempo 
in which critical systems in our society 
become intertwined with normal ICT, the 
increased risk and the societal need for 
reliable infrastructures and safety.  
André Haket: “The risk is that we move 
too slow. The role of government is to 
boost action by the private industry as the 
cyber criminals will not wait. Of course, 
the private industry has to solve the 
security issues themselves and reduce the 
risk. That is not a task of the government. 
The government, however, can help to 
foster knowledge exchange on risk factors 
and good practices in reducing 
vulnerabilities.”  
Frank Heemskerk: “I agree that tempo is 
required. Both government and PCS 
owners need to address the challenges”.  
Cross-sector governance issue 
The next speaker, Peter Hondebrink of the 
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
stated that his department encourages the 
use of ICT on the one hand, but has to 
consider the vulnerabilities on the other 
hand.  
“The majority of the 
critical and economic 
sectors use PCS. 
Incidents in PCS in 
other nations show that serious PCS 
security incidents have occurred. But 
incidents have occurred in The 
Netherlands as well in multiple sectors as 
for instance a TNO-KEMA report [2] 
highlighted.”  
PCS security requires a cross-sector 
approach. Multiple sectors working with 
the NICC are already addressing the PCS 
security issues. That requires 
confidentiality and anonymity amongst 
the participating parties.  
“The confidentiality issue, however, 
makes it a challenge to show that the 
government actions and the public-private 
partnership are effective”.  
He finished by stating that “The Ministry 
of Economic Affairs wholeheartedly will 
support the public-private efforts to 
increase PCS security in all sectors”. 
One participant was not convinced. He 
put forward that utilities are privatised 
without proper governance controls 
guaranteeing resilience and reliability, in 
this case a lack of control on information 
security in critical PCS. “Should the 
privatisation of utilities policy not be 
reversed?”.  
Peter Hondebrink replied that “Security is 
the owners’ own responsibility. If failures 
regularly occur and it becomes a national 
issue, the right government department 
may pick up the escalation process.“ 
“Anti-smoking laws help 
the cyber criminals” 
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Who turned out the lights? 
Eric Byres, a well-known PCS security 
expert, was next: “Who turned out the 
lights?”  
  
Eric Byers explains the PCS risk 
Industrial PCS are vulnerable because 
many people still believe in myths.  
 “Myth 1 – PCS aren’t vulnerable for 
hacks and malware. Wrong!”  PCS have 
limited resources but use the same 
operating systems and CPU as office 
systems with the 
same 
vulnerabilities. 
“Myth 2 – PCS are 
not connected to the 
Internet”. A large 
oil company found that 80% of its PCS 
are connected to its insecure corporate 
network, and that aside of the managed 
connection another seventeen unmanaged 
connections exist between the PCS and 
the outside world.  
Eric showed a list of public examples of 
PCS security incidents, and some 
statistics about the way hackers have 
penetrated into PCS. He discussed the 
vulnerability of PCS for normal network 
security tools in the office environment. 
Security management systems in the 
office environment cannot be applied to 
the 24 by 7 environment. “Nevertheless, 
one can borrow 90% of the ICT security 
good practices and standards for the office 
environment, e.g. ISO/IEC 17799. The 
other 10% requires the same spirit but 
needs to be specialised due to differences 
in assumptions about the office and PCS 
operating environments. This involves 
issues like patching, asset management 
(and scanning), access control, 
standardisation of systems and 
applications, office hours versus 24 by 7 
operations, and incident response.  
Perimeter security is not enough; one 
shall break-up plants into separate zones. 
Critical is the human factor and the 
security awareness of all involved in 
PCS.” 
During the period for questions, one of 
the participants stated that “there is a 
major difference between people respon-
sible for ICT and those operating PCS. 
PCS users talk about their ‘baby’, they are 
passionate to let it perform the process in 
the best way ever. ICT people do not care 
much about IT-hardware such as a laptop. 
He was suggested to refrain of speaking 
about security to PCS personnel. Instead, 
one should introduce security as ‘this is 
making your process 
more safe and 
reliable’.  
Several participants 
objected to this 
suggestion as a CIO or 
CEO needs to take control about 
reliability and shall require that (office) 
ICT and PCS work together as a single 
team.  
Five work sessions 
After lunch, the audience was split up into 
five different work sessions dealing with 
the topics ‘(No) security solutions for 
PCS‘, ‘Patching and hardening’, ‘The 
way to Secure PCS’, and ‘Organisation 
and Management’.  
 
I
Intense discussions took place in the VIP 
round circle workshop  
There was some time for relaxation .. 
 
A special VIP-track was held in which the 
vulnerability of PCS was visualised by a 
life example. The incentives and 
disincentives for ICT security in general 
and PCS security in particular were 
discussed. 
The main issues 
The day was concluded by a panel 
consisting of the work session chairmen. 
The main issues:  
o A first dialog between PCS vendors, 
users and security application vendors 
started. A joint discussion and 
information exchange platform about 
PCS infrastructure security is regarded 
fruitful. A no-go area is a discussion 
about business risk and impact 
aspects.  
o Security is still seen as cost factor; not 
as a risk mitigating factor or 
insurance; how to come to a business 
value? 
o PCS patching and hardening is a 
security need; it is not done yet in the 
right way. Good practices need to be 
explored and exchanged. Legacy is an 
issue as very old operating systems are 
still being used. 
o PCS security requirements should be 
part of procurement, but this is not 
always the case. 
o The drinking water advancements in 
PCS security and their risk analysis 
approach are being looked at by other 
critical sectors that co-operate in the 
NICC. PCS security policies are 
needed, but that requires management 
awareness. How to quantify the risk 
for the management levels?  
39 good practices for 
PCS security in the 
drinking water sector 
have been developed 
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o When safety requirements are met, the 
security requirements for daily 
operations are often met as well.  
The remaining security risk is less 
rational and may hit unexpectedly. 
How to make this remaining risk 
quantifiable? 
o Information security is good business 
practice as one can make risk assess-
ment for PCS security comparable 
with safety risk assessment. PCS and 
‘office ICT’ will converge over time. 
Education, training and partnering of 
all involved is required; the earlier the 
better. 
o There are too many PCS security 
standards; a common international 
cross-sector view is required.  
o Good risk management requires a 
bottom-up involvement of all people 
involved in the organisation. That may 
require another risk management 
culture in the organisation.  
o A number of participants is in favour 
of an obligation to publically report 
incidents if consequences are 
exempted (alike the FAA-model in the 
airline industry). An anonymous 
database managed by a trusted party is 
another alternative to increase the 
sense of urgency and awareness.  
o PCS vendors stated that PCS security 
requirements are often dropped first 
by the PCS buyers when the offer 
exceeds the budget. 
Three recommendations 
The assembly came up with three 
recommendations to the NICC to jointly 
improve the security of PCS: 
o Continue and intensify the dialogue 
about PCS security. 
o Discuss the results of the Process 
Control Event in the NICC sector-
specific working groups. 
o Develop a database and anonymous 
reporting scheme for reporting PCS 
security incidents. 
The event was closed by Annemarie 
Zielstra. She asked all participants to 
consider their commitment about 
participation in the next steps. She 
announced that the next NICC Process 
Control Security Event will happen on 
November 20, 2008. 
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Engineering Privacy: Technologies 
and Strategies for Protecting Data 
The Royal Academy of Engineering published its report Dilemmas of Privacy and 
Surveillance in March 2007.  Two parliamentary inquiries into the state of 
surveillance and data security have followed in its wake, yet the UK has still 
suffered large-scale losses of citizens' personal data.  Here, the lessons of the 
Academy's report are reiterated.   
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  This June, the UK Parliament’s Home 
Affairs Committee published the report 
of its inquiry ‘A Surveillance Society?’, 
which examined the extent of the UK 
Government’s collection of personal 
data and its responsibility for keeping 
that data secure.  This report is the 
latest in a number of studies on the 
impacts of data collection and 
surveillance on society, one of which 
was the The Royal Academy of 
Engineering’s report, Dilemmas of 
Privacy and Surveillance, published 
last year. 
Data – less is more 
One of the overriding messages of both 
the Home Affairs 
Committee and 
the Academy’s 
reports is that the 
key way of 
keeping data 
secure is ensuring 
that only essential data is collected in 
the first place.  Excessive harvesting of 
data increases the risk of loss and 
thereby threatens individual privacy.   
Collective trust is also threatened by the 
excessive collection of personal data.  
Firstly, if people feel that the amount of 
data that the government collects on its 
citizens is unreasonable, this can 
threaten their trust in government.  
Secondly, trust is lost if it is believed 
that a government is not a reliable 
custodian.  This has been shown in the 
UK as a result of the mislaying of large 
quantities of personal data by the Inland 
 Revenue and the Driver and Vehicle  
Licensing Agency.  The loss ofprecious 
personal details such as bank account 
information and children's names and 
ages has demonstrated to UK citizens 
that Government has lessons to learn 
about the importance of, and strategies 
for protecting, personalised data.  
The Drive for Data 
But there are reasons for government 
wishing to collect data, and benefits can 
be gained by having access to greater 
amounts of, and more detailed personal 
information.  The crucial thing is to 
reach a balance between those benefits 
and the threats already described. 
The kinds of benefits intended are the 
creation of a more 
intelligent government 
that can match policy 
solutions to real needs; 
the provision of a more 
personalised 
approached to public 
service delivery and easier access to 
public services.  Another key reason for 
data collection is the increases in 
security it promises – greater 
surveillance and more comprehensive 
and searchable databases are promised 
to bring reductions in crime, control of 
terrorist threats, less opportunity for 
fraud and greater child protection. 
The powers of surveillance 
The first step to realising these benefits, 
however, is to be realistic about the 
extent to which greater surveillance and 
data collection can really deliver them.  
A number of studies, including research 
“The key to data security 
is to limit the amount of 
data collected in the first 
place” 
 23
 
carried out by the UK Home Office, 
have failed to show that increased 
camera surveillance results in a 
reduction in crime.  CCTV footage 
might have a use in identifying the 
perpetrators of a crime, but there is less 
evidence that they actually support the 
safety of members of a community. 
The UK Government is currently in the 
process of introducing a system of 
identity cards, which will be 
implemented alongside an identity 
register, a database holding the 
identification details of UK citizens and 
long term visitors, with records of the 
circumstances of use of those cards.  
One of the advertised purposes of the 
system is to reduce the threat of 
terrorism, but the efficacy of such a 
system to identify, track and deter 
terrorists is yet to be proven. 
  
Engineering Privacy 
One of the main messages of The Royal 
Academy of Engineering's report was 
that engineers have an important role in 
helping to strike the balance between 
the benefits of data collection and the 
threats to privacy and the security of 
data.  The contribution of engineering 
does not lie solely in devising 
technologies to keep data protected.  
One of the essential skills of the 
engineer lies in the ability to devise 
successful systems that comprise both 
human and technical elements.  Be that 
a railway system, a manufacturing 
process or a large IT system, it will 
inevitably feature both technical 
components and human operators and 
users.  Engineers have to understand 
how these human elements will 
function in the system, and will also 
need to be aware of how the behaviour 
of those operators and users can 
jeopardise the system.  Thus part of 
system design is creating clear and 
intuitive processes that will allow the 
human elements and technologies to 
work together.  Another key aspect of 
engineering is ensuring that the 
requirements of a system are clearly 
specified so that it is fit for purpose.   
In the case of databases that contain 
personal data, engineers can help to 
devise both 
technologies to 
protect that data, 
and rules and 
strategies for 
operators and 
users that will 
maintain security.  
Therefore, it is important that the 
organisations that procure these 
databases utilise engineering skill in 
designing and implementing them. 
Foresight for Failure 
One of the main tasks of engineers is to 
foresee and plan for the failure of the 
systems they are designing.  Identifying 
failure modes and ensuring both that the 
likelihood of failure is as low as 
reasonably practical, and that the 
system is fail-safe, is essential in every 
branch of engineering from structural 
engineering to designing software 
systems. 
When a government body or private 
sector organisation creates a database of 
personal information, it is their duty to 
identify the ways that the database 
might fail, including illicit access to 
confidential data and loss as a result of 
technical failure.  It is clear that the UK 
Government is not blind to the 
possibility of the failure of the identity 
databases that it is creating.  For 
example, the proposed children's 
database, which will hold information 
about UK children in order to keep 
track of those who are potentially 
vulnerable, will not hold the details of 
the children of celebrities or other 
public figures.  This demonstrates an 
awareness of the likelihood of failure, 
and one of the most likely modes of 
failure – illicit access to the database by 
individuals attempting to obtain 
especially valuable information.  Since 
it is more likely that the database will 
be broken into in order to access this 
particularly high value data, excluding 
it from the database reduces the 
likelihood that there will be illegal 
access.  However, this 
strategy demonstrates 
the fact that this failure 
mode remains open, 
and that perhaps not 
enough has been done 
to protect the 
information of the rest 
of the UK's children.  
Once such a failure mode has been 
identified, the next step is to design 
procedures and technologies to reduce 
the likelihood and impact of those 
failures. 
Technologies for data security 
The Academy report distinguished three 
main strands of technologies in the 
identity management domain.  First, 
connection technologies allow the 
movement and communication of data; 
second, disconnection technologies 
prevent access to and protect data; and 
third, processing technologies allow 
data to be searched or used.  
Disconnection technologies will be key 
to the design of databases and of 
methods for verifying identity.  A 
number of significant technologies in 
this area should emerge in the next ten 
to twenty years.  First are those that 
provide secure means of proving one's 
right to access a database, an online 
bank account, or similar, which come in 
the form of identity tokens.  Options 
include secure MMC (secure versions 
of the Multimedia Memory Cards used 
in mobile phones and palmtop 
computers) and secure USB (using 
secure USB keys as a way of 
authenticating oneself – with access to 
online services requiring the presence 
of the USB key in the computer).  A 
combination of these identity tokens 
with Public Key Cryptography for the 
security of data offers hope for the 
secure transmission of data and policed 
access to that data. 
“Both technological 
solutions and under-
standing of human 
factors are essential to 
protecting data” 
 24
 
Voice-based interaction is another 
salient disconnection technology. Voice 
is attractive as a biometric identifier 
because it is passive and non-invasive 
compared with biometrics that require 
samples or scans of parts of the body. 
Although these technologies currently 
are not sufficiently reliable, if voice 
recognition and speaker identification 
technologies were to be improved, they 
could provide an option for ensuring 
that only authorised users could access 
valuable data. 
Human Factors  
Although technical solutions and 
procedures can be established to protect 
data, often the weakest point in a 
system is the human operator.  
Therefore, systems that hold or process 
large amounts of personal data must be 
treated in the same way as other critical 
systems that engineers deal with.  A 
nuclear power station or a chemical 
processing 
plant will be 
designed in 
such a way that 
it is extremely 
difficult for an 
operator to 
make an error 
that would easily lead to the leaking of 
radioactive materials or toxic 
chemicals. Barriers should be put in 
place to make it extremely difficult for, 
say, a member of staff to download 
large amounts of personal information 
to insecure media such as CDs, or for 
data to be accessed by anybody but 
trained personnel. 
Training of staff is essential.  Just as 
workers who deal with hazardous 
substances are drilled to understand the 
threats that those substances pose and 
the ways to control them, staff given 
access to sensitive data should be 
encouraged to treat it as if it poses risks 
of a similar magnitude.  
But mistakes and malicious attacks will 
still occur.  The disconnection 
technologies described above can play a 
significant role in minimizing the 
likelihood of such mistakes or attacks, 
but employing the right procedures for 
collecting and storing data is also 
crucial.  Data should be stored in such a 
way that it does not offer a goldmine to 
data thieves nor threaten catastrophe if 
it is compromised. 
 
Procedures for protecting 
privacy 
Databases that contain large amounts of 
personal data about individuals pose the 
greatest threat.  A single database that 
contains enough data 
about each individual for 
a fraudster to be able to 
perpetrate identity theft 
will be a honey pot to 
data thieves.  There is 
also a risk that if it is 
accidentally 
compromised there would be potential 
for opportunist exploitation of the lost 
data.    
Data relevant to different aspects of a 
person's life, required for different 
purposes, should be kept on separate 
databases, or compartmentalised within 
a database as far as possible.  Keeping 
people's personal information 
segregated lessens both the opportunity 
for it to be stolen and used maliciously, 
and the impact of data collection on a 
person's privacy.  Privacy is threatened 
when a person's life story is open to the 
view of an unknown third party, but if 
different parts of that story are kept 
separate, then the story is kept secret. 
Risks are also lowered if people are not 
expected to give away identifying 
information unnecessarily.  The 
Academy's report distinguished 
identification from authentication.  
Identification involves proving who you 
are, authentication involves proving 
that you have the right to access a 
service – for example, proving that you 
have the right to travel on a train 
because you have paid the fare, or 
proving that you have the right to free 
transport because you are over a certain 
age.  Separating authentication and 
identification will allow people to 
access restricted services without giving 
away personalised data, and without 
providers of that service having to hold 
databases of identifying information. 
Conclusion – a change of 
attitude and an embracing of 
technologies 
Through the process of designing socio-
technical systems that are fit for 
purpose, devising new technologies to 
protect data and identifying processes 
that minimise the risk to data, engineers 
can have an important role in securing 
citizen's privacy.  It is key that 
governments who are collecting data 
begin to appreciate the critical nature of 
what they are doing and secure the 
skills of engineers and technologists to 
design systems that work, are low-risk 
and are failsafe. 
“Identification involves 
proving who you are, 
authentication involves 
proving that you have the 
right to access a service”
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Today’s risks to the financial sector  
The CIP Sector “Financial Industry” lost its innocence. The traditional risks have 
been enhanced and therefore the banks have to deal with e-espionage, identity 
theft and the problems of international terrorism. 
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In May 1998, President Bill Clinton 
issued Presidential directive PDD-63 on 
the subject of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection. This directive acknowledged 
certain parts of the national infrastructure 
as critical to the national and economic 
security of the United States and the well-
being of its citizens, and required steps to 
be taken to protect it. This program was 
under control of the DOD and the FBI.  
It was the first time that the term CIP – 
critical infrastructure protection – was 
used.  This was also the first time that the 
national infrastructure was broken into 10 
defence critical infrastructure sectors. 
Characteristic CIP Sectors were, beside 
the government, private services like 
Energy, Transport or Water – the 
importance of the financial Industry was 
in the beginning marginal – with a focus 
on defence activities related to officially 
appropriated funds.  
Lessons learned from 9/11 
After 9/11 a paradigm shift occurred in 
the world of CIP – 
and suddenly 
everybody 
understood the 
importance of 
communication – 
and what happens, 
when this 
communication 
breaks down. The attack against the 
World Trade Centre was a physical attack 
– but one of the side effects was the 
elimination of a major network node in 
one of the towers – and the backup of this 
node in the other tower. As a result, the 
whole city net went down – and the 
banks and stock exchange, which were 
not affected by the primary attack, went  
 
offline for more than one week.  Only 
those banks, which had an emergency 
backup centre in Jersey, were back to 
business in less than four hours.  Weakly 
secured interlinked Infrastructure - and 
the impact of the communication 
breakdown – causes a multibillion dollar 
loss to the financial world. ---  
Money, Money, Money… 
After 9/11, it became evident, that the 
financial industry plays an important role 
in the fight against the international 
terrorism – because Terrorist need 
money!! And it is a bank’s business to 
collect and transfer money. Investigators 
almost immediately identified countries 
or individuals, which invested into 
questionable funds.  Then international 
special investigation groups concentrated 
on the money flow, intercepted critical 
transactions and blocked accounts of 
known – and not known - terrorist 
supporters. All this was possible because 
everything nowadays is online available. 
To find the data, it is only a question of 
computer power and some internal know 
how. Once the FBI 
arrested al Capone 
because of tax evasion– 
today they dry out 
terrorist with the help 
of modern 
communication 
equipment and 
computers – by 
following the 
international money flow.  
The CIP Sector “Financial Industry” lost 
its innocence… 
 
Today’s Risks to the financial 
sector 
The risks have changed. Well, maybe not 
all the risks, but the methods. E.g., fraud 
is still a popular threat, but it is more and 
more ICT based.  
After 9/11, it became 
evident, that the financial 
industry plays an 
important role in the fight 
against the international 
terrorism 
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Identity Theft  
Identity theft is a term used to refer to 
fraud that involves stealing money or 
getting other benefits by pretending to be 
someone else. (Source: Wikipedia). The 
interesting question is, whether this is a 
direct or indirect risk for the bank.  
 In 2006, CNN’s headline in May said: 
Identity theft: The new way to rob a 
bank. HOUSTON, Texas (CNN) -- When 
Bank One notified Houston veterinarian 
Mike Janney that he owed $85,000 on his 
line of credit, he was stunned. 
Janney felt victim to fraud when a bank 
employee sold his personal information 
to an identity theft ring. His bank had to 
cover the loss, along with another $12 
million stolen from other customer 
accounts. 
 That was 2006. Today, Trojans, 
malicious websites or phishing attacks 
collect millions of personal data from 
people all over the world. Sites like 
darkmarket.com sell these data to 
everyone, who is interested. The 
“customer” can buy bank accounts, credit 
card details 
with 
guaranteed 
balance or 
detailed 
information about debtors. He can pay 
online via faked banks hosted by the 
Russian Business Network even with a 
money back guarantee and an escrow 
mechanism. The amount of personal data, 
stored on Drop Zones (these are sites, 
where Trojans or Key-Loggers send the 
captured data to, is in the Terabyte 
Range.  
The data are stolen from the customers 
PC, but there are also targeted attacks to 
the banks data, like a Trojan that is 
harvesting data from internal databases or 
intranet sites.  
The internal risk factor 
Or the data is simply stolen by employees 
or external “specialists” and sold to the 
highest bidder. 10 Years ago a German 
bank became victim of such an attack – 
an external programmer found a list of 
“special” customers. He first started to 
blackmail them directly, and then he 
blackmailed the bank. 
End of day, Fiscal 
investigation got the list 
– and this ended up 
with police searches on 
some of the major 
German banks 
regarding illegal money 
transfer, money laundering and tax 
evasion.  
 And a few months ago similar incidents 
happened in Luxembourg and 
Switzerland – also initiated by insider 
and internal staff.  
The interesting question is: If those 
highly confidential customer data could 
be disclosed and misused – what is about 
internal data of the bank, like strategy 
plans or confidential information from / 
for the board?  
Information Leakages  
Information leakage happens 
whenever a system that is 
designed to be closed to an eavesdropper 
reveals some information to unauthorized 
parties. For example, when designing an 
encrypted instant messaging network, a 
network engineer without the capacity to 
crack your encryption codes could see 
when you are transmitting messages, 
even if he could not read them. During 
the Second World War, the Japanese for 
a while were using secret codes such as 
PURPLE; even before such codes were 
cracked, some basic information could be 
extracted about the content of the 
messages by looking at which relay 
stations sent a message onwards (Source: 
Wikipedia) 
Information Leakage also applies to data 
deemed confidential, which aren't 
properly protected by web sites. These 
data may include account numbers, user 
identifiers (Drivers license number, 
Passport number, Social Security 
Numbers, etc.) and user specific data 
(account balances, address, and 
transaction history). 
But information Leakage is not limited to 
applications. 
Users often are 
careless in the use 
of electronic 
stored 
information. 
Critical 
information is not encrypted; access 
rights are not tight enough. Sometimes a 
copy or an attachment is sent cc: to 
persons, which are not really involved – 
and the mailbox store of certain users is 
bigger than their home directory.  
This all is a paradise for a malicious 
person, who wants to collect interesting 
Data – also, because there are -mostly-no 
mechanisms available, to prevent or 
identify such a reconnaissance operation.  
Information Leakage Protection is a new 
trend for the Security Industry – and a 
new market for the antivirus business. 
But careful: The term information 
Leakage is not clearly defined – and 
available Products differ a lot in 
functionality and usage. All companies 
interested in such a solution are strongly 
advised, to carefully write down their 
requirements and use this to define the 
test cases for the comparison of the 
favoured products -  and do not only look 
on the feature set, but also on the 
integration capabilities into the  existing 
security processes.  
E-espionage, Globalisation and 
the Wild, Wild East… 
Most banks today still see the major risk 
in fraud or other, similar threats – threats, 
that are targeting the money…But what 
about the disclosure of internal data, like 
strategy information?   
Like this bank, which was 
using life production data 
on test systems…? 
Or the data is simply 
stolen by employees or 
external “specialists” and 
sold to the highest  
bidder ... 
 27
 
Today we talk about globalisation, about 
the role, the financial industry will play 
in the international world. New markets 
are coming up, and the banks see the big 
business in former member states of EX-
Soviet Union or China. But they 
sometimes forget that these countries are 
different – in behaviour and business 
culture. 
For some of those countries, it is quite 
normal, to use all options to gather the 
necessary information. In other countries, 
the secret services are still ruling – and 
working closely together with the local 
industries.  
So the banks have to learn, to be prepared 
against attacks which they never thought 
about – attacks from an opponent, who is 
familiar with all those things, we only see 
in a James Bond Movie. And of course, 
the attacks are not only IT based. Yes, in 
a TV Show, it is always the hacker who 
is getting all the info. But in the real life 
it is more complex – it is always a 
mixture of extortion, social engineering, 
violence, break-ins and – maybe - some 
real hacking.  
But who is prepared? Which organisation 
is able to fight a blended attack – using 
traditional crime methods together with 
high tech? In most organisations, IT 
Security and internal security are two 
different entities, mostly without any 
communication. One solution is a 
Cybercrime Incident Response Team or 
CIRT. It combines the recourses of 
internal and IT Security and helps to react 
fast to all kind of attacks – from terrorist 
to hacker. 
A little spy-how-to …. 
A few words about e-espionage and how 
easy collecting information is. Let’s 
assume, there are employees who need 
some extra money and decided to go for 
Industrial Espionage. So, what do they 
need for a successful spy attack? Well, 
it’s easy, and all is available on the 
internet. First of all, they need a good 
modern Trojan. It must be flexible and 
easy to configure – that gives an excellent 
return on malware investment (ROMI).  
They only want to spy, not to manipulate. 
So they don’t need any sophisticated tool 
to capture sessions or extract forms. But 
some web based Command Centre would 
be fine, it’s so common…To be on the 
safe side, they order all this from the 
friendly Russian Solutions Provider. 
Investment is between 200US$ and 3000 
US$. Delivery is fast and secure, and they 
will also receive a bill. 
As a Drop Zone (Collector System) they 
can use a few systems in the victims IT 
Centre, which was prepared earlier. They 
only want the Trojan to collect docu-
ments and PDF’s from the Project 
“Armageddon”, so they use the web 
based Command & Control System to 
configure the 
Trojan. The 
next step is to 
infect the 
targets. That’s 
easy, too. They 
setup a website 
for a project, or 
an info page, 
or maybe a server with the latest digital 
pictures from the big party last weekend. 
They can use WMF exploits directly, but 
there is some risk, because the Company 
is updating their AV Pattern quite fast. So 
they use a modified and outdated Web 
attacker (that’s an attack toolkit), because 
JavaScript is allowed in our target 
environment. To be on the safe side, they 
encrypt the source with tools like HTML 
Protector. And for those, who will not 
visit the website, they prepare some fancy 
USB Sticks with some presentations and 
the Trojan… 
That’s it. Now they have to wait. At the 
end of the Week, they use their IPod to 
copy the Payload from the Drop Zones. 
Nobody has a problem with a guy and his 
stylish MP3 Gadget, and the Security 
Check at the gate only look for Laptops. 
End of day, there is only one thing to do: 
To review the data and sort it for 
potential “Customers” 
 
National Risk Impact 
Most of the above mentioned threats are 
targeting the bank – and not the critical 
infrastructure of the country. Of course, 
there are side effects. One example is if a 
local bank is sold to a foreign investor 
with questionable goals,–and if this 
investor could gain advantages in the deal 
because he had illegal insider informa-
tion. Another scenario is an electronic 
attack against the international cash flow 
by attacking systems like SWIFT.  But 
still one of the most critical things is 
money laundry. When drug runners and 
terrorists want to park illicit cash, there 
may be no better safe place than hedge 
funds. For more than three years, the 
Securities & Exchange Commission and 
the Treasury Dept. have 
been discussing how to 
include hedge funds in 
the USA Patriot Act, the 
2001 legislation 
designed to protect 
against terrorism. Yet 
during that time, the 
$1.3 trillion plus hedge 
fund industry has collected record 
amounts of cash, some of which could 
well be from questionable sources. As it 
stands, hedge funds have no 
responsibility to determine the sources of 
investor funds or to analyze whether 
they're questionable. This is a perfect 
mechanism for mafia groups and 
terrorist.  
Risks to the financial sector changed in 
the last years. Automated electronic 
attacks like internal Trojans, e-espionage 
and information Leakage are only a few 
examples. Together with the 
globalisation, with international 
partnerships, other risks occurred – and 
good selling products like hedge-funds 
have the potential to turn into a national 
risk. 
First of all, we need a good 
Trojan, fitting our needs. ... 
It’s flexible and gives an 
excellent return on 
malware investment 
(ROMI) 
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Cyber Security Assessment of a 
Power Plant 
Critical Infrastructures are nowadays exposed to a new kind of threats due to the large number of 
new vulnerabilities and architectural weaknesses introduced by the extensive use of ICT into 
such complex critical systems. We present the first outcomes of an exhaustive ICT security 
assessment analysis, targeting a real thermal Power Plant. 
 
Introduction 
 Nowadays the process control network 
of most power plants is integrated with a 
broader information system including 
the company business network. 
Moreover, 
most mainten-
ance services 
on process 
control equip-
ment are 
remotely 
performed. 
There has been a qualitative leap in the 
last years in the need to safeguard those 
installations against malicious activities 
by actors such as terrorism, organised 
crime or violent extremism (for instance, 
radical environmentalists). On the one 
hand, the security conditions suffered a 
drastic change after September 11, 2001. 
On the other, the intensive use of ICT 
has opened new ways for carrying out 
attacks.  
The paradox is that the more ICT 
systems are employed, the more 
opportunities there are for intrusions by 
external and internal malicious actors. A 
violation of the integrity, availability or 
even the confidentiality of data might 
produce significant damage to assets of 
the company and be part of a broader 
aggressive action.  
These situations cannot be ignored 
because the potential consequences of an 
incident can be severe: the cost of a 
power plant shut down is huge, and 
release of pollutants from a plant in the 
environment can provoke vast damages.  
 
Security assessment  
We propose a systematic approach to 
this problem based on a Security 
Framework. This provides an overall 
model for a methodical characterisation 
of the security require-
ments that a distributed 
Integrated Control System 
(ICS) should satisfy. The 
framework, taking as 
reference the standard 
ISO/IEC 17799 (Code of 
Practice for Information 
Security Management), has three main 
purposes:  
1. framing the problem (i.e. stating 
which are the information and 
communication elements to protect),  
2. categorizing the requirements 
(typically referring to the three 
security properties to satisfy: 
confidentiality, integrity and 
availability); and  
3. defining the ICT security policy. 
Once the problem is framed, it is possib-
le to conduct a Security Assessment, 
i.e. a risk-oriented analysis of the system 
for the identification of the assets that 
could be menaced by internal and 
external threats, which take advantage of 
vulnerabilities. The normal sequence of 
the analysis initiates with the characteri-
sation of the assets, for then evaluating 
the possibility that the combination of 
threats and vulnerabilities might pave 
the way for potential attacks. These 
attacks are studied making reference to 
known attack patterns so as to evaluate 
their capabilities to affect the services 
and assets of the system under study,  
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and the potential countermeasures. The 
assessment finishes with the quanti-
fication of the potential impacts and 
their likelihood. 
As soon as the assessment is ready, the 
identified attacks can be simulated. This 
Attack Simulation can be done either 
using the ICS of the case studied, or 
employing a full simulation environment 
(i.e., where the same SCADA are simu-
lated). The complete architecture comp-
rises: 1.) a simulator of the physical 
system being controlled (e.g. the power 
plant or a section of it); 2.) the real-time 
part of the ICS under study (or a simu-
lation of  it); 3.) the rest of the ICS (e.g. 
database, communication links, etc.); 4.) 
any remote control system (or their 
simulation); 5.) the attacker simulator; 
and 6.) the simulation management. 
Results of the preliminary 
Security Assessment on a 
target Plant 
According to the approach presented 
above, we carried out a preliminary 
security assessment of the ICS of a 
target power plant. Although several 
features of the real ICS were stream-
lined, the target system was close to the 
ICS of the power plant.   
The target system and its ICS functions 
were analyzed in order to identify 
(System framing): 
• Asset classification and control 
(human/organisational actors; 
hardware, software and information 
assets, components and subsystems, 
interfaces); 
• Data flows (complete life-cycle of 
each data package; who can do what 
on them); 
• System operational context (the 
different usage states, conditions and 
procedures). 
According to this analysis, the ICS inc-
ludes several main subsystems (fig. 1): 
• the Process Control System, 
• the Process Control and Data 
Acquisition System (Process 
SCADA), 
• the Control network,  
• a Data network,  
• business applications based on the 
Company Intranet, and  
• the main Firewall between the data 
network and the Intranet. 
The results of this framing step were 
used to perform a System requirements 
analysis, in order to define for the ICS: 
• Network security requirements 
(Architecture requirements, network 
access control requirements, 
communications management); 
• Node security requirements (node 
access requirements, operations 
management). 
This set of requirements was employed 
for the defining the current Information 
Security policy, containing: 
• Access control policy; 
• Communications and operations 
management policy (including Data 
 
Fig 1. The ICS of the target plant  1 
 30
 
Authentication Policy, Data flow 
security policy and Data 
confidentiality policy). 
• System maintenance policy 
(including a procedural guideline for 
the secure maintenance of SCTI). 
Based on the results of the previous 
phases, the Security Assessment 
provided a detailed analysis of the 
potential threats, of the main system 
vulnerabilities, and the most likely 
attack scenarios. Countermeasures for 
opposing the potential security failures 
were identified: 
• To counter vulnerabilities (reporting, 
changing configuration, patching, 
etc.) 
• To counter  threats: which preventive 
measures to apply for dealing with 
threats before their actualisation (e.g. 
preparedness, review of security 
policies, testing)  
• To counter attacks: which 
instruments to deploy for dealing 
with cyber incidents, before, during 
and after an attack occurs (e.g. 
firewalling, intrusion detection, 
cyber forensics)  
Potential Threats were analysed based 
on an FBI classification of threat agents 
which includes: 
• Crackers:  external agents with 
certain knowledge about computer 
and communication systems, which 
may break into the system violating 
security measures.  
• Insiders: disgruntled employees, or 
outsourcing vendors and other actors 
who benefit of permits for physical 
and cyber access to the system 
facilities. They do not need a great 
deal of knowledge about computer 
intrusion, because their knowledge 
of a target system allows them to 
gain unrestricted access to cause 
damage or to steal system data. 
• Malware writers: malicious code 
writers produce software designed 
specifically to damage or disrupt 
systems, such as a virus, a worm or a 
Trojan horse.  These are normally 
known as Malware. They can be 
specific (target to particular systems 
or even organisations), or generic. 
• Organised Crime: There is an 
increased use of cyber intrusions by 
criminal groups who attack systems, 
mainly for monetary gain. These 
groups might try to get internal 
information for blackmailing the 
company, or to extort by menacing 
the dissemination of some sensible 
information, or to commit different 
types of fraud (e.g. influencing some 
prices), or forgery (e.g. changing 
values in bills). 
• Terrorist groups: terrorism is the 
unlawful use of force or violence 
against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, 
the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives.  
• Hacktivists:  politically motivated 
attacks on publicly accessible Web 
pages or e-mail servers. These 
groups and individuals overload e-
mail servers and hack into Web sites 
to send a political message. 
• Information Warfare: several nations 
are aggressively working to develop 
information warfare doctrine, 
programs, and capabilities. Such 
capabilities enable a single entity to 
have a significant and serious impact 
by disrupting the supply, 
communications, and economic 
infrastructures that support military 
power—impacts that can affect 
infrastructures as one key column of 
a country.  
In our case, five different types of threat 
agents were considered: Insiders, 
Crackers, internal and external 
Malware, Organised groups (these 
include terrorism and hacktivism), as 
Information Warfare threats currently 
appear to be negligible in Europe. 
These potential actions of threat agents 
were classified based on their potential 
actions. The most dangerous are: 
Insiders, Crackers and Organised 
Groups. All of them have the same 
likelihood of occurrence and potential 
impact severity, although for different 
reasons. While Insiders have an easier 
access to internal resources and a better 
knowledge of assets and potential 
weaknesses, organised groups have 
more motivation and own resources (and 
potential availability of expertise). On 
the other hand, Crackers are ubiquitous 
and their hazard grows with the 
increasing visibility of critical 
infrastructures. 
The Vulnerability Assessment identified 
156 major vulnerabilities in the ICS of 
the target plant. These were classified 
according to their likelihood of occur-
rence and potential impact severity. 
Both were given a numeric value (1, .5, 
or .1) corresponding respectively to: 
Almost Certain, Likely and Improbable, 
and Vital, Heavy and Minor impact.  
Combining these two factors two 
weakness indices were computed: a 
Weakness Worst Case and a Weakness 
Cumulative Index. According to this 
analysis, all main subsystems, and 
especially the Process Control System, 
the SCADA, the Data network, and the 
Firewall, resulted heavily vulnerable, as 
presented in the Radar Charts of Fig 2. 
 
Fig.2: Weakness worst case Radar Chart  
Attack scenario analysis 
Despite the huge number of different 
kinds of attacks that can be carried out 
against a host or a network, they can be 
classified in a limited number of catego-
ries, or scenarios  (Reference: Attack 
modelling for information security and 
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survivability, A. Moore, R. Ellison, R. 
Linger, March 2001, SEI). We carried 
out a systematic review of those attack 
categories for verifying their feasibility, 
by checking them against the already 
identified vulnerabilities. The attacks 
that were identified to be most likely and 
dangerous were: 
• Radius Server Denial of Service: 
DOS attacks have the scope of 
causing damage by drastically 
limiting, or even denying, access to 
specific resources, such as the 
company Intranet and the Power 
Plant Network thus making them 
unusable to intended users. Such an 
attack has a direct impact on the 
Power Plant maintenance and 
management routines. 
• Domain Credential Stolen/External 
Connection DoS: this attack scenario 
has two different goals: 
o to obtain the credential of a user 
which tries to log itself from 
Internet to the Radius Server 
o to make an external connection 
DoS avoiding the user to be 
remotely logged on the 
Intranet/Power Plan network.  
In this scenario, the attacker has 
already obtained the control of a 
machine in the same sub-network of 
the Radius Server. The first goal of 
the attacker is to be able to capture 
the authentication request and 
responses of the users. Once 
obtained the authentication/response 
packets, the attacker is able to make 
a direct cryptanalysis. After having 
sniffed the authentication and 
response packet, it is possible to 
predict the sequence number of the 
packet responses, impersonate the 
Radius Server, and reply to the users 
using ad-hoc forged reject packets.  
• Intranet Virus Infection: Viral infec-
tions can attack all environments 
connected to an open network. There 
are several ways by which viruses 
can be transmitted, for instance 
networks, data download and, in 
general, all data incoming from all 
sorts of connections and local input 
streams (e.g. floppy disks, CDROM 
and other kinds of removable media). 
Anti Virus software is the most 
important instrument against viral 
infection. However, even a fully 
patched system with an updated 
antivirus may be vulnerable to virus 
attacks in the interval between the 
release of the virus code, and the 
moment the Anti Virus vendors 
provide a new updated package. 
Damages caused by viruses may 
vary from minor disruption to major 
malfunction and even service 
disruption; in some cases, viruses are 
also programmed to install a 
backdoor on the infected system, in 
order to allow the attacker to 
remotely control the infected 
workstation. 
• Data Network Worm Infection: 
Computer Worms are self-replicating 
computer programs that run indepen-
dently and travel across network 
connections. The main difference 
between viruses and worms is the 
method in which they reproduce and 
spread: a virus depends on a host file 
or boot sector and, in order to be 
transferred between two computer, it 
needs that a file is transmitted; on the 
contrary, a worm can run completely 
independently and spread itself 
through network connections. Once 
activated, a worm can behave as a 
virus, install Trojan horses or 
execute operations on the infected 
system. 
• ISDN Router Attacks: this scenario 
is possible due the presence of an 
ISDN Router in the SCADA 
Network. Such router is not managed 
by the operator of the plant, but it is 
under the direct control of an 
external company. The Router is 
used by the external company to 
control, manage and maintain the 
SCTG system. When there is any 
need in that sense, that company 
produce a telephone call to the 
Router ISDN, makes a login and 
then becomes logically connected to 
the SCADA Network. In our scena-
rio, the attacker starts operating at 
this point. After a standard system 
fingerprinting, he identifies the pre-
sence of that router. Once the router 
is online, the attacker, either by brute 
force or by sniffing, tries to identify 
a correct login and password.. If the 
attack is successful, the attacker ac-
quires a direct access to a portion of 
the SCADA network, the one which 
contains the router and the SCTG.  
• Phishing Attacks: this attack is 
normally used to gather information 
from legitimate users leveraging 
their confidence on the “look & feel” 
of a web portal; a phishing attack is 
usually carried out by making the 
target users connect with a malicious 
web site, set up in a way to make 
them believe to be connected with a 
legitimate website. As a result of this 
action, a legitimate user might 
supply sensitive data and/or login 
credentials to the attacker.  
These attack scenarios were analysed 
according to their Plausibility and 
Severity: three seem to present a highest 
risk: Infection due to virus reaching 
the Intranet, Infection due to worms 
in the Data network, and attacks to 
the ISDN router employed for external 
access by suppliers/service providers. 
The likelihood of occurrence of 
infections is high, and this calls for 
maximum attention with respect to 
prevention and protection mechanisms. 
In addition, specific procedures are 
needed to react to evolving infection 
situations. The attack to the ISDN router 
is also highly likely, as it is the case of 
any external Internet access point.  Its 
direct access to critical resources makes 
it a crucial point for the security of the 
system. 
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Governance and Risk Management 
in a globally integrated Ecosystem 
Service orientation and event- and model-driven process management will deliver 
critical information infrastructure security – provided that well-designed govern-
ance, risk and lifecycle management models are applied. 
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Problem Space 
Service orientation at the enterprise or 
ecosystem level has been proven to be 
the primary enabler by which organi-
sations can become and operate as glo-
bally integrated enterprises. 
The implementation of service-oriented 
architectures (SOA) with support for 
coherent opera-
tional processes 
requires inter-
operability not 
only on the net-
work, but all the 
way up to the 
procedural level – 
with integration of both real-lives as 
well as virtual reality systems for 
knowledge management as well as 
decision support.  
Synergies exist between the leading 
industry frameworks for simulation 
systems and IT solutions. The Object 
Management Group (OMG) specifies 
and sets the standards around model-
driven architecture (MDA).  
The Simulation Interoperability Stan-
dards Organisation (SISO) is the stan-
dardisation organisation for Modelling 
and Simulation (M&S), especially for 
the military space. High-level Architec-
ture (HLA) has proven efficiency. 
Therefore, the introduction and adoption 
of ideas and concepts of HLA into MDA 
is subject to ongoing discussions [1]. 
Interoperability by Semantics 
The European study on “advanced tech-
nologies for the interoperability of hete-
rogeneous enterprise networks and their  
applications” [2] defines levels of in-
teroperability and gives guidance on the 
roadmap to achieve semantic interopera-
bility on all levels: 
 an enterprise service bus (ESB) as 
the backbone needs to provide the 
core integration, communication 
and collaboration services to estab-
lish connectivity, 
 data exchange 
standards allow 
for the 
interoperability 
of  systems or 
applications 
with similar 
functions, e.g. 
presentation of data in geospatial 
context, 
 ontologies can be used to structure 
and exploit the information domain 
and generate knowledge and insight 
out of data. They are the foundation 
of semantic interoperability, and 
 finally, coherent processes across 
organisational and systems’ 
boundaries can be governed on base 
of these ontologies and the use of  a 
process control language defined by 
a controlled natural language for 
knowledge representation. 
 
Model-Driven Lifecycle 
The Open Group defines the concept of 
enterprise architecture (EA) as a layered 
set of models [3]: 
 Organisation 
 Process 
 Information 
 Application  
 Infrastructure 
Governance of this architecture is per-
formed in context with the EA strategy. 
Frameworks for model-
driven architectures (MDA) 
and product development 
based on modelling and 
simulation (M&S) converge 
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The common strategic imperative of all 
networked ecosystems is the efficient 
and effect-oriented performance of the 
critical information infrastructure during 
a given reference scenario instantiated at 
a particular time.  
Efficiency and effectiveness have to be 
measured against the current operational 
capabilities of the organisation. Capa-
bility gaps lead to transformation initia-
tives implementing the next version of 
the enterprise architecture.  
The transformation roadmap is sup-
ported by state-of-the-art model-driven 
development and governance technolo-
gies, which allow for efficient lifecycle 
management 
(LCM) not 
only of 
singular 
products, but 
the enterprise 
architecture itself. 
On the strategic business level, key 
performance indicators model a bal-
anced scorecard which has to be con-
sidered when defining the linkages be-
tween strategy level metrics and the 
underpinning process metrics. The com-
position of a supporting IT solution 
should be based on abstract business 
objects (ABO) patterns to allow for 
flexibility and re-usability in various 
client environments. 
Service component architecture (SCA) 
focuses on patterns for the development 
of functional components and their later 
integration with foundation infrastruc-
ture services to define application ser-
vices using platform independent mo-
dels to trigger the generation of plat-
form-specific code. Real-time data 
monitored to capture IT performance 
needs to be fed back into a business 
intelligence exploitation backbone and 
presented in a business performance 
dashboard to flexibly govern the busi-
ness optimisation process.    
Threat and Risk Models 
Organisations and networked ecosys-
tems are facing multiple dimensions of 
pressure as it relates to successfully 
operating in an increasingly competitive 
environment, e.g.: 
 CBRNE threat 
 external attacks on facility 
 cyber warfare 
 weaknesses in information assur-
ance 
 system failure 
 human factors  
 
The governance, risk and compliance 
(GRC) solution space needs to address 
three different categories 
of concerns throughout 
the ecosystem: 
Enterprise GRC: 
 Is performance 
optimal? 
 Are the right risks addressed?  
 Are we compliant to external 
regulations and internal policies? 
 Is an integrated view applied? 
 
IT Governance: 
 Are investments optimized? 
 
IT Risk Mitigation (CIIA): 
 Are we addressing the right opera-
tional risks? 
 Are we compliant to service level 
agreements? 
 
Models to express risk on the business 
level can be categorized and used to 
define proper measures to protect the 
critical information infrastructure:  
 Contextual Risk Specification: 
subjective opinions about the risk 
are identified and the perceived 
leading indicators are leveraged to 
determine an event has occurred. 
An event is a complex combination 
of situational attributes and their 
geospatial relationships. 
 Probabilistic determination: 
looking at historical performance as 
well as subjective assessments one 
can use Bayesian formulas to 
predict threats and risks. 
 Risk management models: 
by aligning profiles of risk in con-
text to business processes and con-
trols, we can create a more accurate 
representation of risk based on con-
trol execution effectiveness. Risk 
profile can be used in complex 
event detection and processing. 
 
Service Orientation and EA 
Whereas SOA can be considered an 
enterprise architecture model, it is not it 
is not equivalent with the standardized 
EA definition. Nevertheless, there is a 
considerable amount of interlock be-
tween the two approaches to business 
transformation.  
SOA is an approach, that through a set 
of methods provides flexibility to treat 
elements of the organisation and its 
underlying infrastructure as standard 
components, which can be reused and 
combined to address operational priori-
ties as required to enable an enterprise 
architecture, which can respond with 
flexibility and speed to any citizen or 
government demand, military mandate 
or external or internal threat and risk.  
A service-oriented enterprise is primar-
ily about bridging the gap between busi-
ness and IT infrastructure – for all ar-
chitecture artefacts: components, ser-
vices, compositions and value. In the 
terminology of EA, there needs to be a 
model for each type and set of artefacts. 
These models cannot been considered 
and developed independently, but have 
to be closely interlocked. In particular, 
the end-to-end service identification and 
implementation needs to provide trace-
ability of performance impacts both 
forwards and backwards between both 
the functional and operational level of 
the organisation as well as in the IT-
infrastructure domain. Semantic interop-
erability based on metadata models 
Governed Interoperability 
can be achieved via the 
use of ontologies and a 
process control language
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(ontologies) and common understanding 
of abstract business objects is key to 
service orientation. The integration and 
exploitation of information from various 
data sources (e.g. sensors for external 
conditions, network and application 
monitoring systems and situation and 
event detection services as well as 
searchable, rich knowledge bases) is the 
enabler for SOA governance and risk 
management.  
Governed Service LCM 
Performance and risk models need to 
guide and govern the SOA implementa-
tion in all phases of the services’ life-
cycle.  
Service 
Identification 
A business 
problem or 
requirement 
results in the 
identification of a future service: 
 establishment of ownership 
 definition of role of intended service 
 allocation of funding 
 impact analysis and scheduling 
 
Outcome of this phase is the authorisa-
tion of procurement. 
Service Specification 
follows and consists of the following 
tasks: 
 development, assembly and test 
using best practices for re-use 
 leverage of architectural policy 
adherent to global standards 
 design for re-use and effective re-
use in implementation 
 policy and contract validation dur-
ing development 
 
Outcome of this phase is a service ready 
for certification and available for 
Service Implementation 
according and compliant to: 
 change management policies 
 production configuration and work-
load planning 
 verification procedures in opera-
tional context 
 deployment best practices to 
production systems 
 
Thus approved the service will enter the 
next stage: 
Service Operation 
While being operational, 
the performance of the 
service is monitored and 
measured against the 
scorecard and key 
performance indicators, 
finally entering the next optimisation 
and innovation cycle: 
 policy enforcement 
 monitoring for IT and business as 
well as risk management  
dashboards 
 quality-of-service management 
 service revision and retiring policy 
 
Summary 
Critical information infrastructure assur-
ance can be achieved by taking an ap-
proach of model-driven risk manage-
ment, protection and underpinning the 
implementation with a robust enterprise 
architecture and EA transformation 
strategy. 
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The International CIIP Handbook 
2008/2009 
In September 2008 the Fourth Edition of the Critical Information Infrastructure Handbook will 
be published. This publication, like its predecessors, will facilitate a review of problems 
regarding CIIP policy. Below is a summation of themes and trends in CIIP policy. 
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The Continued Need for Critical 
Information Infrastructure 
Protection 
At present – and as a result of 9/11 – 
there is a great degree of time and 
attention expended upon the protection 
of physical infrastructure. Whilst this 
attention on physical infrastructure is not 
unworthy it should not be at the expense 
of dedication to Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection (CIIP). Two 
recent events highlight the necessity of 
continued attention to CIIP. 
Firstly, on March the 7th 2008 the Hatch 
Nuclear Power Station (Georgia, US) 
initiated an automated emergency 
shutdown after a computer on the plant’s 
business network was rebooted 
following a software download. The fact 
that this power station, like most others, 
operates an internal network which is 
connected to the internet means that a 
number of security challenges have been 
introduced to the system but, 
problematically, 
these issues haven’t 
yet been adequately 
addressed. This 
event is 
symptomatic of a 
wider problem now 
facing infrastructure in almost every 
nation and every sector. 
Secondly, the unprecedented DDoS 
(Distributed Denial of Service) attacks 
upon Estonia’s information technology 
infrastructure over a prolonged period in  
April/May 2007 highlights the  
 
vulnerability of all nation’s regarding 
Critical Information Infrastructure (CII). 
The Estonian government, and later 
private installations, were subjected to a 
barrage of cyber attacks that effectively 
disabled them for weeks.  
These two incidents show the continued 
relevance of and necessity for CIIP. The 
International CIIP Handbook, first 
published in 2002 now in its fourth and 
substantially expanded edition, offers a 
comparative overview of these 
protective efforts.  
The 2008 Handbook 
The CIIP Handbook focuses on national 
governmental efforts to protect critical 
(information) infrastructure. The overall 
purpose of the International CIIP 
Handbook is to provide an overview of 
CII protection practices in an 
increasingly broad range of countries. 
The initial eight countries from the 2002 
edition (Australia, Canada, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the 
United States) were 
substantially updated 
and supplemented by 
six additional surveys 
in the following 2004 
edition (Austria, 
Finland, France, 
Italy, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom). In 2006 we added an 
additional six country surveys to the 
existing fourteen, with a distinct focus 
on Asia (India, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, Russia, and 
Singapore).  
The utility of the 
Handbook is in offering 
nations a guide when 
constructing their own 
‘best fit’ policy 
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The inclusion of five new states (Brazil, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Spain) to 
the repertoire of cases consolidates and 
further builds upon previous editions of 
the Critical Information Infrastructure 
Handbook (CIIP) to bring the total 
number of states analyzed to 25. The 
Handbook has served both policy 
makers and researchers as an invaluable 
tool and guide to policy on Critical 
Information Infrastructure Protection.  
Format of the 2008 Handbook 
The systematic layout of the Handbook 
facilitates easy navigation and 
comparison between the various 
elements of CIIP. There are five focal 
points identified by the handbook: 
The definition of critical sectors: A core 
definition of what the particular state 
believes to constitute critical sectors is 
provided, in terms of both CI and CII 
where available. 
Past and present CIIP initiatives and 
policies:  A brief review of past policy 
regarding or relevant to CIIP with a 
description of the various governmental 
capacities in which these initiatives or 
policies were implemented. 
Organisational structures: The third 
section is an overview of public sector 
actors at a national level responsible for 
provision of various services regarding 
CIIP. Importantly, due to the extensive 
private ownership of elements of both 
CI and CII, public/private partnerships 
are also reviewed with regards to CIIP. 
Early warning approaches and public 
outreach: The national organisations 
instrumental in the provision of early 
warning of threats, namely CIIP-related 
information-sharing organisations such 
as Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs) or Information Sharing 
and Analysis Centres (ISACs) are 
reviewed. Public outreach programs are 
also documented. 
Law and legislation: The final section 
catalogues relevant legislation enacted in 
order to ensure CIIP. Law regarding 
issues such as IT security, fraudulent use 
of a computer, handling of electronic 
signatures, damage to data and data 
protection as well as any legislation 
bestowing responsibility on particular 
organisations for CIIP are provided 
where available.  
An extensive 
appendix is also 
provided that 
offers an 
invaluable 
reference utility. 
The ‘Countries at a Glance’ section 
concisely summarizes the most 
important actors, legislation and 
documents regarding a particular nation, 
allowing the opportunity to quickly 
overview current CIIP policy. In 
addition a bibliography, list of experts 
consulted and a directory of important 
and relevant links are also all included. 
 
Evolution versus Persistent 
Problems 
After six years of publication the CIIP 
Handbook allows us the opportunity to 
identify the problems of these varied 
responses to CIIP policy. Perhaps the 
most important point to be made 
regarding CIIP policy is that despite 
continual innovation regarding 
initiatives, legislation and policy in 
general the underlying problems persist. 
Frustratingly the problems identified in 
the United States Presidential 
Commission’s report on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) under 
the Clinton Administration in 1997 are 
still prevalent over a decade later. 
Policy efforts are caught in a cyclical 
state due to the difficulty of addressing 
their underlying factors. 
The primary generic problems facing 
CII, both in 1997 and today, are that of 
interdependency, the challenges posed 
by public-private collaboration and the 
global character of information 
communication technology (ICT).  
Issue One: Interdependency 
The interdependency between varying 
sectors of critical 
infrastructure is, 
arguably, one of the 
most important 
relationships for CIIP. 
Interdependency exists 
between physical 
infrastructure and 
Critical Information Infrastructure as 
well as interdependency between 
different sectors of infrastructure 
(communications, energy, transport). 
For example the 1997 US PCCIP report 
heralded the Energy sector as the 
“lifeblood of these interdependent 
infrastructures” which is to say that 
incapacitation of energy infrastructure 
would have a knock-on effect leading to 
incapacitation of all other infrastructural 
sectors.  
Attempts to eradicate vulnerabilities in 
one infrastructural sector (such as 
energy) are flawed if attempts aren’t 
made to address vulnerabilities in other 
infrastructural sectors (such as 
telecommunications) due to the mutual 
dependency between these two sectors. 
Infrastructure is comparable to a chain 
with all infrastructure being only as 
strong as the weakest of its links. 
Little progress has been made in 
addressing this interdependency, which 
has in fact been exacerbated over time 
due to the growth of Information 
Communication Technology (ICT). As 
highlighted above in the case of the 
Hatch Nuclear Power Station there are 
numerous weak links between different 
sectors. 
Frustratingly the 
problems identified in the 
U.S. 1997 PCCIP report 
under the Clinton 
Administration still exist 
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Initiatives promoting cross-sector 
collaboration were formulated as a 
solution to avoid autonomous weak links 
and create a sense of a vulnerable 
cohesive whole; however deficiencies in 
some sectors continue to plague the 
entire system. 
Issue Two: Challenges to 
Public-Private Collaboration 
The large degree of private ownership of 
infrastructural components essential to 
the state necessitates collaboration 
between the private and public realms to 
ensure Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection. Over the years 
that the CIIP Handbook has been 
published there has 
been evidence of an 
increasing trend 
towards public-
private partnerships 
(PPP). However, a 
number of 
problems remain. 
One of the most 
prominent issues regarding public-
private partnership is the role of trust. In 
order for a PPP to work there must be a 
basis of mutual trust when passing 
sensitive information. Cultivation of a 
system of trust takes time furthermore 
trust can only be formed by 
collaboration, while such collaboration 
itself depends on trust (this is akin to the 
Chicken-Egg paradox). 
Another issue that is yet to be 
substantially addressed regarding public-
private partnerships is the lack of 
incentive on the part of the private sector 
to invest in the protection of the nation’s 
entire infrastructure, which would 
inevitably lead to the incurring of great 
costs. Obviously the lack of incentive 
and method of protection isn’t uniform, 
a business in commerce or finance is 
more predisposed to protect itself and its 
sector than one in transport and it is this 
disparity that remains a problem today. 
Determining the design for PPP’s in 
CIIP is not an easy task. The CIIP 
Handbook documents the varied 
responses of 25 nations regarding their 
believed ‘best practice’ approaches to 
these difficult issues. 
 
Issue Three: The Global 
Character of Information 
Communications Technology 
Another problem is presented to the end 
of CIIP via the inherently global nature 
of Information Communication 
Technology (ICT). 
The lack of a 
cohesive multilateral 
framework to unite 
currently fragmented 
nations efforts means 
that borders still serve 
as a barrier of 
immunity from prosecution. Whilst 
Information Communication 
Technology transcends borders, 
legislation regarding ICT does not; this 
inconsistency is open to manipulation by 
those fomenting malice. 
At present there is little legislative 
prescription that endeavours to address 
the global extent of ICT and regulate 
international incidents. The difficulty of 
constructing a pragmatic solution to this 
problem is clear, every nation is at a 
different stage of ICT development and 
as such uniform regulative policy seems 
unfeasible. The CIIP Handbook offers 
an analysis of the beginnings of some 
regional and international organisations 
that could, in the future, offer a potential 
forum to address this problem. In 
addition the International 
Telecommunication Union through its 
‘Global Cybersecurity Agenda’ (GCA) 
has made substantial progress in 
proposing what an international 
framework for organizing national cyber 
security efforts might look like. 
Future Projects 
 
The numerous difficulties facing those 
developing CIIP policy, as highlighted 
above, mean that it is imperative to 
identify successful approaches and ‘best 
practices’ in this field. The newest 
edition of the CIIP Handbook continues 
to offer a useful monitoring function and 
a consequent forum for comparative 
analysis between an ever-increasing 
number of nations. 
However, the purpose of the CIIP 
Handbook is not to compile a 
framework for practitioners about the 
proposed ‘best’ policy regarding CIIP 
but, instead, to offer an objective 
analysis of past and contemporary CIIP 
policy. The utility of the handbook is in 
its ability to offer expert-verified 
analysis as well as a forum for reference 
and comparison.  
The Centre for Security Studies further 
plans to establish a “special interest 
community” in the field of CIIP in order 
to foster increased collaboration between 
subject matter experts in CIIP in 2009. 
An online version of the CIIP Handbook 
will be part of this community. 
 
(The 2008 CIIP Handbook will be 
available online at www.crn.ethz.ch 
from September). 
 
The Handbook was written by Elgin 
Brunner and Manuel Suter, researchers 
at the Centre for Security Studies at the 
ETH Zurich. 
 
 
CIIP requires cross-
sectoral as well as 
public-private 
collaboration and a 
consistent global 
framework regarding ICT 
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CRITIS’08 - 3rd International 
Workshop on Critical Information 
Infrastructures Security 
The 3rd international Workshop on CIs and their ICT from 13th to 15th of October 
2008 in Rome wants to continue the success of its predecessors and seeks to at-
tract researchers and professionals from all kinds of large critical Infrastructures.  
Program Co-Chairs 
 
 
Stefan Geretshuber 
IABG mbH, Germany 
InfoCom, Safety & Security, 
Dept. for Critical Infrastructures 
e-mail: Geretshuber@iabg.de  
 
 
Roberto Setola 
University Campus BioMedico, Italy 
Complex System & Security Lab 
e-mail: r.setola@unicampus.it  
  
Modern society’s dependency on infra-
structure services has been widely re-
cognized. The abundance of these ser-
vices is no more thinkable without ICT 
that therefore became a key-resource. At 
the same time ICT is considered as 
being one of the most vulnerable 
elements of the whole system. 
To continue with the success of its 
previous editions in 2006 and 2007, 
CRITIS´08 for the third time will bring 
together experts from science, industry 
and public authorities to provide an 
interdisciplinary and multi-faced dia-
logue about the third millennium secu-
rity strategies for Critical Information 
Infrastructures and their protection. 
CRITIS’08 is co-organised by ENEA 
and by the Italian Association of Critical 
Infrastructures Experts (AIIC). 
The Program Committee received a 
great number of articles that illustrate 
research results, R&D projects, survey-
ing works and industrial experiences 
related to the subjects of the work-shop 
and conducted a thoroughly peer review 
process. 
Program 
Within three days CRITIS´08 will 
present the 25 most attractive high-
quality papers from science and industry 
arranged in the following six sessions: 
• Modelling and Simulation 
• Dependency analysis and modelling 
• Increasing resilience and self-healing 
• Vulnerability and risk analysis 
• Cyber threats & SCADA 
• Security and Crisis Management 
Each session will be chaired and 
introduced by invited talks from very 
 
 
 well known research personalities of the 
international CI domain. Additional 
introductive speeches from the national 
Prime Minister Office and the European 
Commission will underline the impor-
tance and significance of the workshop 
issues. 
One highlight will be as well the round 
table on the current and future 
challenges of Critical (Information) 
Infrastructure Protection attended by 
recognised international experts from 
industry, research and politics. 
A complementary poster session and a 
special session on the result of the FP6 
research project IRRIIS will complete 
the broad program. 
Location & more 
The marvellous workshop location of 
“Villa Mondragone” and the elegant 
Gala Dinner in Rome will contribute in 
making the outstanding event memo-
rable for a long time. Beautiful situated 
near Rome, Villa Mondragone has been 
the residence of Popes and famous fami-
lies of the ancient nobility over the 
course of its long history. Today it offers 
with its wonderful gardens and 
magnificent view towards Rome an 
excellent and exclusive surrounding for 
CRITIS’08. 
Organisational 
The workshop fee includes catering, gala 
dinner and one copy of the workshop 
post-proceedings published by Springer 
in the Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science series. 
The CRITIS’08 organisation committee 
very gladly welcomes you at CRITIS’08 
Workshop. For detailed information and 
registration please visit: 
http://critis08.dia.uniroma3.it 
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Invited Professor Positions – Univ. 
of Lisboa Faculty of Sciences FCUL 
The challenge for PhD wanting an academic career. 
 
 
 
Invited Professor Positions – Univ. of Lisboa 
Faculty of Sciences (FCUL) 
 
The Department of Informatics of Univ. Lisboa Faculty of 
Sciences (FCUL) welcomes applications from candidates of 
any nationality with a PhD, for two positions of Professor 
Auxiliar and/or Professor Associado, Convidado em 
Dedicação Exclusiva (Full-time Invited Assistant and/or 
Associate Professor). 
The selected candidates will partake the Department’s 
teaching and research activities in Computer Science and 
Engineering, in the area of Organisation of Computational 
Systems (OSC, www.di.fc.ul.pt, including the programs of the 
international partnership with Carnegie Mellon University 
cmuportugal.di.fc.ul.pt.  
 
The Department of Informatics is very well ranked in the 
national evaluations 
www.di.fc.ul.pt/candidatos_licenciatura/?curso, and has a 
strong international standing in the research activities in the 
area http://lasige.di.fc.ul.pt.  
 
Conditions: 
Up to 4 years contract, salary according to category. 
 
Criteria of preference in order of importance: 
  Graduate and/or post-graduate studies in the area of OSC 
or similar (including operating systems, networking, 
distributed systems, security, dependability, real-time). 
 Track record of research, namely in the area. 
 Experience in university-level teaching. 
 Fluency in the Portuguese language. 
 
Candidates must provide, until the 31st July 
2008: 
Curriculum vitae (name, address, degrees, work/research 
experience, publications, citations, achievements, etc.) 
 Transcripts of grades and proofs of the capabilities stated 
by the candidate. Copies allowed. Legal originals 
required in case of selection. 
  Letter of intent (up to one page) mentioning the personal 
motivations for applying to the Univ. of Lisboa. 
 Two letters of reference, sealed, together with application, 
or sent by referees directly to the organisation contact, in 
plain ASCII or PDF or paper, by fax/mail or email 
(Subject: Concurso Professores Convidados). 
 
Organisation contact data: 
Concurso Professores Convidados 
Departamento de Informática - Faculdade de Ciências 
da Universidade de Lisboa 
Bloco C6 Piso III, Campo Grande 
Lisboa - 1749 – 016 
Portugal 
 
Email: secretaria@di.fc.ul.pt   
Internet: www.di.fc.ul.pt 
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ECN-10 Selected Links and Events 
 
Actual Upcoming CIIP Conferences in Europe 
• IST events, http://europa.eu.int/information_society/newsroom/cf/newsbytheme.cfm?displayType=calendar&tpa_id=7 
• 1st International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience (ICCR 2008), August 26 and 27, 2008 in 
Davos, Switzerland: www.tinyurl.com/ICCR-2008  
• 4th International Conference on IT-Incident Management & IT-Forensics www.imf-conference.org 
• 3rd International Workshop on Critical Information Infrastructures Security, critis08.dia.uniroma3.it 
• INFSO D4 events, http://cordis.europa.eu/ist/trust-security/events.htm 
• Conference is sponsored by the Next Generations Infrastructures Foundation and the IEEE Systems, Man & Cybernetics 
Society: “Building Networks for a Brighter Future, 10-12 November 2008, De Doelen Congress Centre, Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands: http://www.nginfra.nl/conference2008/ 
 
Studies on EU Policy Initiative on Critical Communication and Information Infrastructure Protection 
• Promoting a secure Information Society: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/index_en.htm 
• The main elements of the Secure Information Society strategy were endorsed by the European Council in a Resolution  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:068:SOM:EN:HTML    
• European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33260.htm  
• Directive on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve 
their protection: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st09/st09403.en08.pdf 
• Areci Study: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/strategy/activities/ciip/areci_study/index_en.htm 
• EISAS–European Information Sharing and Alert System: http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/studies/EISAS_finalreport.pdf  
• Critical information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) : 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/strategy/activities/ciip/index_en.htm 
 
European Projects or Projects with Articles in this Issue 
• IRRIIS – Integrated Risk Reduction of Information-based Infrastructure Systems: www.irriis.eu 
• Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen: http://ipsc.jrc.it 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm?id=1630&lang=en 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm?id=2360&obj_id=PROJECTS00000000030002AA&dt_code=ACT&lang=en   
• Governance and Risk Management in a globally integrated Ecosystem: References:  www.athena-ip.org  
www.opengroup.org/togaf/ 
• The International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009: (available 4Q2008): www.crn.ethz.ch 
• Invited Professorship /MSc in Information Secuirty: www.di.fc.ul.pt  cmuportugal.di.fc.ul.pt 
 
E-Reports 
• The Royal Academy of Engineering published its report Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance in March 2007: 
www.raeng.org.uk/policy/reports/pdf/dilemmas_of_privacy_and_surveillance_report.pdf 
 
Series of new Reports 
• Martin Rudner, Protecting Canada’s Energy Infrastructure Against Terrorism: Mapping a Proactive Strategy, CEIPPR 
Research Series No. 1 – 2008 
• Jacques J.M. Shore , The Legal Imperative to Protect Critical Energy Infrastructure, CEIPPR Research Series No. 2 – 2008. 
• Jack F. Williams, Al-Qaida Threats and  Strategies: The Religious Justification for Targeting the International Energy 
Economy, CEIPPR Research Series No.3 – 2008. 
• Sean Burges, Jean Daudelin, & Roy Fuller, Latin America’s Energy Infrastructure and Terrorism: A Tentative Vulnerability 
Assessment, CEIPPR Series No. 4 – 2008 
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IMF 2008 
4th International Conference on 
IT-Incident Management & IT-Forensics 
 
September 23 - 25, 2008 
Mannheim, Germany 
    www.imf-conference.org/ 
mailto:2008@imf-conference.org 
 
Conference of SIG SIDAR 
of the German Informatics Society (GI). 
   
 
Call for Participation: see www.imf-conference.org  
Information technology has become crucial to almost every part of society. IT infrastructures have become critical in the world-
wide economy, the financial sector the health sector, the government's administration, the military, and the educational sector. 
Although security usually gets involved into the design process of IT systems nowadays, the process of maintaining security in 
the operation of IT infrastructures, in most cases, still lacks the appropriate attention. The capability to manage and respond to IT 
security incidents and their forensic analysis are not well established. The quickly rising number of security incidents worldwide 
makes the implementation of incident management capabilities essential. 
 
Program with Keynotes held by:  
 
 
 
Dr. Udo Helmbrecht 
 
Präsident des Bundesamtes für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik (BSI) 
 
 
John L. Cole 
 
US Army Research Laboratory 
Chair, IEEE Task Force on Information Assurance (TFIA) 
 
 
Fred-Mario Silberbach 
 
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) LS - Stab der Amtsleitung 
Felix Lindner ('FX') Recurity Labs GmbH
Preliminary Program 2008 
 
• Using Observations of Invariant Behaviour to Detect 
Malicious Agency in Distributed Environments 
• Network Forensics of Partial SSL/TLS Encrypted Traffic 
Classification Using Clustering Algorithms  
• Forensic Computing Framework to fit any Legal System 
• File Type Analysis Using Signal Processing Techniques and 
Machine Learning versus file Unix Utility for Forensic 
Analysis 
• Reconstructing People's Lives: A Case Study in Teaching 
Forensic Computing 
• Live Forensic Acquisition as Alternative to Traditional 
Forensic Processes 
• 6Foren: Online Forensics in IPv6 Network Environment 
• IPv6 Attacking Test Using ICMPv6 Messages 
• Building a state tracing Linux Kernel 
• Network Flow Security Baselining 
 
IMPORTANT DATES 
September 8, 2008: Early registration will end 
September 23-25, 2008: IMF 2008 Conference 
 
 
 42
 
 
Federal Department of Defence, 
Civil Protection and Sport DDPS 
Federal Office for Civil Protection 
 
 
 
ICCR 2008 
1st International Conference on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience (ICCR) 
  
an Associated Conference to the International Disaster & Risk Conference  
(IDRC Davos 2008) 
Davos, August 26-27, 2008 
 
Organised and co-chaired by the Swiss Federal Office for Civil Protection 
and IDRC Davos 2008 
 
mailto:ski@babs.admin.ch 
 
Call for Participation: see www.tinyurl.com/ICCR-2008 
 
The theme of the ICCR 2008 is "Expanding the Concept of Critical Infrastructure Protection: From Protection to Resilience." The 
conference will take an integrated, multidisciplinary approach when addressing the different aspects of CIP and resilience. It 
particularly makes the point that it does not suffice to physically protect critical infrastructures, but that a holistic approach 
including an integrated risk management cycle and risk governance is necessary by specifically including measures that increase 
the systemic and social resilience. 
 
The conference builds on the five EAPC/PfP Workshops on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) and Civil Emergency 
Planning (CEP) between 2003 and 2007 and further expands on its network and information platform as well as deepens its 
knowledge and expertise. 
 
Program Chair: 
 
Dr. Stefan Brem, Head of Risk Analysis and Research Coordination, Federal Office for Civil Protection, Switzerland  
 
Speakers include: 
 
• Michel Bruneau, Buffalo University, New 
York, US 
• Jost-A. Studer, Studer Engineering, CH 
• Wolfgang Kröger, ETH Zurich, CH 
• Jean-Pierre Nordvik, JRC, Ispra, I 
• Ortwin Renn, University of Stuttgart, GE 
• Adrian Gheorghe, Old Dominion University, 
Norfolk, US 
• Ivo Menzinger, Swiss Re, CH 
• Eric Luiijf, TNO, The Hague, NL 
 
Programme Highlights: 
 
• Integrated Risk Management in a CIP Context 
• From Protection to Resilience 
• From Defining Critical Sectors to Establishing Criticality Criteria 
• Public Private Partnerships: Concepts and Applications 
• Planning and Disaster Response 
Registration: 
There is no limitation of participation per country or institution. 
Registration is possible directly on the website: 
tinyurl.com/IDRC-2008-registration 
 
